Background
An indictment was filed against Hagai Elyakim Avers in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa Magistrate’s Court (case no. ת”פ 15230-05-24). On July 1, 2025, that court adopted the Probation Service’s recommendation and ordered the matter to continue before a community court. On July 6, 2025, the Supreme Court (Justice Knafo-Steinitz), with the parties’ consent, transferred the proceedings to the Jerusalem Community Magistrate’s Court because the petitioner was then residing in Jerusalem (הד”פ 1591-07-25).
Roughly a year later, the petitioner filed the present application seeking a further transfer — this time to the Tel Aviv-Jaffa Community Magistrate’s Court. He argued that his center of life had since moved from Jerusalem to Herzliya, where he wished to integrate into a therapeutic framework, and that the Tel Aviv-Jaffa community court was the appropriate venue going forward. He noted that the Jerusalem Community Court (Justice Zimmerman), in a decision dated May 4, 2026, had stated it had no objection if such a transfer were sought.
The State opposed the application. It pointed out that the May 4, 2026 Jerusalem Community Court decision also documented a troubled record: the petitioner had repeatedly failed to appear at hearings, failed to maintain contact with the court, and had arrest warrants issued against him. Because no rehabilitation progress had been made since the petitioner entered the community court process, the Jerusalem court scheduled a sentencing-arguments hearing for June 29, 2026, stating that “it is not possible to allow the conduct that has occurred so far to continue.” The State argued that given the advanced procedural stage, the sitting court’s familiarity with the case, efficiency considerations, and the fact that this was already a second transfer request, the application should be denied.
The Court’s Holding
Justice Kasher denied the application. He acknowledged the established principle that the “shall not be transferred again” rule in Section 78(c) of the Courts Law [Consolidated Version], 5744-1984, does not as a matter of jurisdiction bar the Supreme Court from ordering a second venue transfer under Section 78(a). However, he reaffirmed the equally well-settled rule that such a second transfer will generally be inappropriate because it risks harming the efficiency of the courts — citing Bsh”p 994/19 Sulman v. State of Israel (para. 5, Aug. 16, 2022) and Bsh”p 6199/22 Ishtamkar v. State of Israel (para. 4, Nov. 30, 2022).
The court found no exceptional circumstances warranting departure from that default. The proceedings had been before the Jerusalem Community Court for approximately one year — having been transferred there initially at the petitioner’s own request. The May 4, 2026 decision showed that since entering the community court process, the petitioner had made no rehabilitation progress whatsoever, prompting the Jerusalem court to schedule a sentencing hearing. In these circumstances, ordering yet another transfer would require an entirely new panel to acquaint itself with the case from the beginning, with no corresponding benefit that could justify the disruption.
Key Takeaways
- The Supreme Court retains jurisdiction to order a second venue transfer under Section 78(a) of the Courts Law even where Section 78(c)’s “shall not be transferred again” rule applies, but will do so only in genuinely exceptional circumstances.
- A petitioner’s change of residence after a prior consent-based venue transfer is not, by itself, a sufficient ground for a further transfer — particularly where the case is at an advanced stage and the existing court is already familiar with the matter.
- A defendant’s poor engagement with community court proceedings (missed hearings, arrest warrants, lack of rehabilitation progress) weighs against granting a second transfer, as it undermines the claim that a new forum would produce better rehabilitative outcomes.
- Court efficiency and continuity are significant countervailing interests; forcing a new panel to restart from scratch imposes institutional costs that must be justified by concrete, compelling circumstances.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces a consistent line of Supreme Court authority limiting serial venue-transfer applications in criminal proceedings. While the court carefully preserves its statutory power to grant such requests, it signals that defendants who have already obtained one consent-based transfer face a high bar when seeking a second — especially when the stated reason (a subsequent change of residence) is self-generated and the proceedings are nearing conclusion.
For practitioners advising defendants in community court proceedings, the ruling underscores that a request to transfer venue should be made thoughtfully and with a long-term view: once a transfer is granted, a further relocation of residence is unlikely, on its own, to justify another one, and a poor compliance record will actively undercut any such application.