Background
This case arises from a civil action in Kenton Circuit Court in which plaintiffs Ricky and Karen Grimes pursued claims against Summit Medical Group, Dr. Michael Davenport, Anthem Health Plans of Kentucky, and Saint Elizabeth Medical Center. During discovery, the trial court entered an order that Summit Medical Group and Dr. Davenport interpreted as compelling them to obtain Dr. Davenport’s “Completed Application Materials”—documents he had submitted to Saint Elizabeth for medical staff credentialing—and disclose them to the plaintiffs. Saint Elizabeth had asserted those materials were protected from disclosure as records of a peer review function under Kentucky’s peer review privilege statute, KRS 311.377(2).
Summit Medical Group and Dr. Davenport sought a writ of prohibition in the Court of Appeals to block enforcement of the trial court’s order, arguing that complying with it would require them to violate Saint Elizabeth’s asserted privilege. The Court of Appeals denied the writ, and the matter reached the Kentucky Supreme Court, where it was consolidated with a companion case, Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, Inc. v. Hon. Patricia Summe, No. 2025-SC-0236-MR (Ky. Jun. 25, 2026). The companion case directly addressed whether the Completed Application Materials fall within the privilege of KRS 311.377(2) and whether the trial court had conducted the proper statutory analysis.
In the companion case, the Supreme Court held that the Completed Application Materials are subject to the general peer review privilege under KRS 311.377(2), but that KRS 311.377(3) excepts from that privilege any materials or information that are otherwise independently discoverable. Because the trial court had not conducted that analysis, the Court issued a writ in the companion matter and remanded for proper proceedings. The present case presented the corollary question: whether Dr. Davenport himself could be ordered to obtain and disclose the same materials notwithstanding Saint Elizabeth’s privilege claim.
The Court’s Holding
The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals as to result only, declining to issue a writ of prohibition in favor of Summit Medical Group and Dr. Davenport, and remanded the case to Kenton Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with the companion opinion. The Court identified two independent grounds for denial. First, the Appellants themselves acknowledged uncertainty throughout their briefing as to whether the trial court’s order actually required them to obtain the Completed Application Materials from Saint Elizabeth and produce them over Saint Elizabeth’s privilege objection. Speculative or ambiguous claims of harm do not meet the threshold for the extraordinary remedy of a writ of prohibition; the appropriate procedural step was a motion for clarification in the trial court.
Second, even accepting the order as sufficiently definite, the Appellants’ claim is entirely derivative of Saint Elizabeth’s privilege assertion. Because the companion case remands for the trial court to determine whether any portion of the Completed Application Materials falls within the KRS 311.377(3) exception to the privilege, the question of whether Dr. Davenport can separately be compelled to disclose privileged materials is not yet ripe. The harm the Appellants feared—being forced to produce information that is ultimately determined to be privileged—cannot materialize until the trial court completes the required statutory analysis and issues a concrete ruling.
Justice Nickell concurred in the denial of the writ but dissented from the remand instructions, maintaining that the Appellants’ failure to establish the existence of any privilege in the first instance justified outright denial without further proceedings.
Key Takeaways
- A party’s writ of prohibition claim that rests entirely on another party’s asserted privilege is derivative and may be unripe if that underlying privilege question remains unresolved and is itself subject to remand.
- Speculative or ambiguous claims of potential harm—including uncertainty about what a trial court’s order actually requires—are insufficient to support the extraordinary remedy of a writ; counsel should first seek clarification from the trial court.
- This opinion must be read in tandem with the companion case, Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, Inc. v. Hon. Patricia Summe, No. 2025-SC-0236-MR (Ky. Jun. 25, 2026), which controls the underlying privilege analysis under KRS 311.377(2) and (3) and should be consulted first.
- This is a “Not To Be Published” opinion under Kentucky RAP 40(D) and may not be cited as binding precedent, though it may be cited for consideration under RAP 41 if no published opinion adequately addresses the same point of law.
Why It Matters
For healthcare practitioners and institutions in Kentucky, this decision reinforces that the peer review privilege under KRS 311.377(2) can generate layered discovery disputes when multiple defendants are involved—one holding the underlying privilege, another potentially ordered to produce the same materials. The Court’s ripeness analysis offers practical guidance: a party who has not yet suffered a definitive adverse ruling, and whose only harm is contingent on how a co-party’s separate privilege motion resolves, has not yet earned access to extraordinary writ relief.
The case also underscores the importance of procedural precision in privilege disputes. When the scope of a discovery order is ambiguous, the failure to seek clarification in the trial court can doom a writ petition at the appellate level. Practitioners defending credentialing and peer review records should ensure the trial court has issued an unambiguous ruling before seeking extraordinary relief, and should track the companion Saint Elizabeth decision for guidance on how Kentucky courts will apply the KRS 311.377(3) independent-discoverability exception going forward.