Background
Kelly Fitzgerald and James Jackson have been locked in a protracted Family Court dispute over custody, visitation, and child support of their minor children. The Rhode Island Supreme Court had previously addressed the case in Fitzgerald v. Jackson, 307 A.3d 1283 (R.I. 2024), remanding with instructions that the Family Court proceed “as expeditiously as possible” to an evidentiary hearing on custody and visitation. On remand, Jackson — a self-represented litigant residing in Australia who appeared throughout via WebEx — renewed a jurisdictional challenge under G.L. 1956 § 15-14.1-20, which a Family Court justice rejected in June 2024. The court simultaneously established a detailed summer 2024 visitation schedule.
Jackson continued filing numerous additional motions, and on May 15, 2025, he moved to recuse the Family Court justice assigned to adjudicate custody. He grounded his motion in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Rule 2.11 of the Rhode Island Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires recusal when a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Jackson argued the trial justice had shown bias by withholding visitation rights, failing to timely rule on pending motions, making discriminatory statements and rulings, and suppressing evidence.
After a hearing at which Jackson again appeared by WebEx, the trial justice reviewed the record, exhibits submitted by both sides, the judicial canons, and relevant case law, and denied the motion. She found no ground for disqualification. Jackson moved to stay the denial pending appeal; the trial justice granted the stay, and Jackson appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Court’s Holding
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court’s denial of the recusal motion, concluding that Jackson failed to affirmatively establish the personal bias or prejudice required to support disqualification. The Court applied an abuse-of-discretion standard of review and found none. It emphasized that a litigant seeking recusal must show the judicial officer holds “a preconceived or settled opinion of a character calculated to impair his or her impartiality seriously and to sway his or her judgment,” citing In re Adele B., 229 A.3d 671, 682-83 (R.I. 2020).
As to Jackson’s specific arguments, the Court found that the trial justice’s prioritization of the recusal motion over other pending motions was a legitimate exercise of docket management discretion, not evidence of bias. It further held that adverse evidentiary rulings alone do not establish prejudice, citing the well-established principle that unfavorable rulings are insufficient to support recusal. The Court also rejected Jackson’s due process claim, noting that the trial justice had afforded him ample opportunity to file and be heard on motions, accommodating his pro se status and overseas residency through WebEx appearances.
The Court remanded the papers to the Family Court for further proceedings, including the long-pending evidentiary hearing on custody and visitation.
Key Takeaways
- A party seeking recusal must affirmatively prove personal bias or prejudice amounting to a settled opinion that impairs impartiality — generalized dissatisfaction with rulings is not enough.
- Adverse rulings, delayed scheduling decisions, and unfavorable evidentiary calls do not, standing alone, constitute evidence of judicial bias sufficient to compel recusal.
- Trial justices have broad discretion to manage their dockets, including the discretion to prioritize threshold motions such as recusal before addressing other pending matters.
- Accommodating a pro se, overseas litigant with virtual appearances satisfies due process; the court expressly commended the justices for permitting WebEx participation.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the high bar Rhode Island courts impose on recusal motions, particularly in contentious family law proceedings where one party is self-represented and dissatisfied with the pace or outcome of litigation. By making clear that docket management choices and adverse rulings are not proxies for bias, the Court limits the use of recusal motions as a litigation tactic to delay or reset custody proceedings.
The opinion also signals the Court’s impatience with delay in a case it has already remanded once with explicit instructions to proceed expeditiously. Practitioners and pro se litigants alike should note that unfavorable judicial decisions — even a pattern of them — will rarely meet the threshold for establishing the kind of personal, settled prejudice that Rhode Island law requires before a judge must step aside.