Background
A is a very young child whose case arose from serious injuries sustained at a few weeks old. In a prior fact-finding judgment, the court determined that A suffered inflicted non-accidental injuries—two fractured ribs and multiple areas of bruising. The court found the mother caused these injuries and the father failed to take reasonable protective steps. A has been in the care of his paternal grandparents since the outset of proceedings and is now settled in that placement.
The proceedings revealed a pattern of serious dishonesty by both parents, who concealed the true nature of their relationship (falsely claiming separation when they were not), domestic abuse incidents, and mental health concerns. The parents failed to seek timely medical attention for A following the injuries. Throughout the proceedings, the parents disclosed critical information only when confronted with independent evidence, such as phone records analysis by police.
The mother continued to deny responsibility for the injuries. The father asserted acceptance of the court’s findings but remained aligned with the mother and demonstrated no behavioural change demonstrating protective capacity. Both parents applied for a Resolutions or AAA (Assessment, Analysis and Achievement) assessment—a structured model designed to test whether safe rehabilitation is possible despite denial by establishing robust external supervision and monitoring frameworks.
The Court’s Holding
Her Honour Judge Hesford refused the parents’ application for a Resolutions assessment and made a Special Guardianship Order in favour of the paternal grandparents. The court held that such an assessment was not necessary to determine A’s welfare under section 13 of the Children and Families Act 2014, which imposes a high threshold: the assessment must be necessary, not merely desirable or potentially helpful. The court found the existing evidence was substantial, clear, and sufficient to determine welfare issues without further assessment.
The court held that the risks in this case are established and unmitigated, not speculative or uncertain. They include proven physical harm, the mother’s continued denial, entrenched dishonesty towards professionals (particularly the concealment of their relationship and domestic abuse), unhealthy relationship dynamics, and the father’s failure to demonstrate genuine insight or protective capacity. The court found that the father’s stated acceptance of the findings was qualified and revealing—he stated he accepted the mother was “the perpetrator of the injuries to A, based on the evidence and how it was presented in court,” suggesting forensic acceptance rather than genuine internalisation. His continued prioritisation of the relationship over A’s safety was direct evidence of insufficient protective capacity.
The court held that participation in a Resolutions assessment would not produce reliable evidence because honesty, transparency, and constructive engagement—which are fundamental to such assessments—were absent. The parents’ sustained and pervasive dishonesty, including lying even after police disclosure and during the trial itself, created a real risk that the assessment process would replicate historical difficulties rather than generate genuine probative evaluation. The proposed supervision framework by extended family members was inadequate; key supervisors (particularly the maternal grandfather) had been oblivious to serious difficulties in the household at the time of A’s injuries, undermining confidence in their protective capacity. The delay inherent in a 4-month assessment (pushing total proceedings to 70–75 weeks) would directly prejudice A’s welfare by postponing permanence and risking stability in his current placement.
Key Takeaways
- The availability of a Resolutions model does not determine whether an assessment must be ordered; the court must apply the statutory test of necessity, not mere desirability.
- Where risks are already clearly established and well-evidenced through prior findings, further assessment may not be necessary even where denial persists.
- A parent’s qualified or forensic acceptance of findings—as opposed to genuine internalisation—is relevant to and can undermine assessment of protective capacity.
- Pervasive dishonesty and concealment from professionals, particularly when sustained even after confrontation with evidence, can render further assessments unreliable.
- In cases involving very young children requiring permanence and secure attachment, the impact of delay on the child’s welfare is a weighty factor against ordering further assessment.
- Proposed family supervision frameworks must be assessed in light of whether key supervisors have demonstrated understanding of safeguarding concerns and ability to act protectively in the past.
Why It Matters
This judgment provides important guidance on the limits of Resolutions assessments in family proceedings. While such models may in appropriate cases provide a structured means of testing rehabilitation despite denial, this decision clarifies that the court’s discretion to order them is constrained by the statutory necessity test and by the child’s paramount interests. The judgment rejects the proposition that Resolutions assessments are appropriate whenever serious harm findings coexist with parental denial. Instead, the court emphasizes that risks must be evaluated based on the evidence already available, and that where risks are known, serious, and unmitigated by demonstrated insight or protective capacity, further assessment may introduce delay without producing materially new or reliable evidence.
The decision is also significant for very young children in care proceedings. It underscores the acute importance of avoiding delay when a child of A’s age requires permanence and secure attachment. The court held that the certain harm caused by delay (measured in many additional months of uncertainty in proceedings already at 52 weeks) must be weighed against speculative and limited benefit of further assessment. This reflects the principle, enshrined in section 1(2) of the Children Act 1989, that delay is likely to prejudice the welfare of the child.