Background
Edward A. Morgan, Sr. died on October 8, 2023, leaving a will executed on June 10, 2022 that bequeathed his entire estate—including his real property—to his sister, the petitioner. His two children, Renee J. Whitehead and Edward A. Morgan, Jr. (referred to collectively as the objectors), were completely disinherited. They filed affidavits of objection in the Probate and Family Court pursuant to G.L. c. 190B, §§ 1-401(e)–(f), asserting three grounds for contesting the will: undue influence, fraud, and lack of testamentary capacity.
The objectors’ affidavits painted a troubling picture. They alleged that the sister had “reappeared” in the decedent’s life in spring 2022—just as he was ending a relationship with a companion who had been caring for him—and had promptly “arranged for the retention of” an estate attorney who drafted documents leaving everything to the petitioner. They further alleged that the decedent had been suffering from a degenerative cognitive condition causing memory loss and erratic behavior for several years before the will was signed, and that the petitioner withheld information about his health from his children. The petitioner moved to strike the affidavits, and a Probate and Family Court judge allowed the motion, finding the allegations insufficient to establish any of the three grounds. A decree admitting the will to formal probate entered.
The objectors appealed, contending that their affidavits were detailed enough to trigger further proceedings and, specifically, that the burden of proving lack of undue influence should have shifted to the petitioner as a putative fiduciary.
The Court’s Holding
The Appeals Court, in a Rule 23.0 summary decision by Blake, C.J., Shin, and Wood, JJ., affirmed the decree in full. The court reviewed the Probate and Family Court’s ruling de novo and addressed each of the three challenges in turn.
On undue influence, the court applied the four-factor framework from O’Rourke v. Hunter, 446 Mass. 814 (2006): an unnatural disposition, by a person susceptible to influence, to the advantage of someone with an opportunity to exercise influence, who in fact used improper means to procure the disposition. The objectors sought to shift the burden to the petitioner by characterizing her as a fiduciary, which under Rempelakis v. Russell, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 557 (2006), requires that the proponent was in a fiduciary relationship with the decedent, benefited from a transaction with the decedent, and actually took part in the questioned transaction. The court held that the affidavits failed on every sub-element. A general allegation that the decedent “allowed [the petitioner] to start to handle his affairs and care” does not establish a fiduciary relationship; under Cleary v. Cleary, 427 Mass. 286 (1998), “family relations do not suffice to create a fiduciary relationship.” And while arranging for an estate attorney and the attendance of witnesses is suspicious, it is not the kind of “participat[ion] in the drafting process” or intrusion into the attorney-client relationship that courts have required to shift the burden. Without burden-shifting, the objectors had to allege specific facts supporting an unnatural disposition and improper means—and they had failed to allege that either child had seen or spoken to the decedent in the period leading up to execution of the will, fatally undercutting the “unnatural” prong.
On fraud and lack of testamentary capacity, the court reached the same conclusion. The fraud claim rose and fell with undue influence. On capacity, the critical question is whether the decedent lacked sound mind at the moment of execution, not before or after; the objectors’ affidavits pointed to Facebook posts from 2019 and 2022 expressing anger and an August 2023 hospital visit where the decedent failed to recognize Renee’s husband—more than a year after the will was signed—neither of which spoke to capacity in June 2022.
Key Takeaways
- Under G.L. c. 190B, § 1-401, an affidavit of objection to a will must state “specific facts and grounds” akin to the particularity required by Mass. R. Civ. P. 9(b) for fraud; the burden is higher than a standard complaint, designed to screen out frivolous will challenges.
- To shift the burden of disproving undue influence to the will’s proponent, an objector must allege facts showing (1) a fiduciary relationship between proponent and decedent, (2) that the proponent benefited from the transaction, and (3) that the proponent actually participated in the contested transaction—not merely that the proponent arranged for an attorney or attended the signing.
- Family relationships—including a sibling who handled a decedent’s affairs—do not automatically create a fiduciary relationship under Massachusetts law; financial dependence and active participation in the transaction are necessary predicates.
- On testamentary capacity, evidence of cognitive decline at other times, or of failure to recognize family members more than a year after execution, does not establish lack of capacity at the moment the will was signed.
Why It Matters
This decision offers a useful practitioner’s checklist for surviving a motion to strike an affidavit of objection in Massachusetts probate proceedings. Will contests commonly arise in exactly the circumstances presented here: an elderly decedent with diminishing capacity, a new caretaker who arranges estate planning, and estranged children who discover their disinheritance only after death. The court’s message is that sympathy for the objectors’ situation is not enough—affidavits must translate the narrative of suspicion into specific factual allegations that map onto the legal elements of undue influence, fraud, or incapacity at the time of execution.
The burden-shifting analysis is particularly important: Massachusetts has a well-developed line of authority on when a proponent of a will must disprove undue influence rather than the objector proving it, and this decision clarifies that neither being a caretaker nor retaining the estate attorney crosses that threshold without evidence of actual participation in the drafting process or documented financial control over the decedent. For estate litigators, the decision serves as a reminder to load the affidavit with contemporaneous observations about the decedent’s mental state near the execution date—not general allegations of cognitive decline—and to plead specific instances of isolation or control by the proponent, not merely exclusion of heirs from information about the decedent’s health.