Claywell v. Commonwealth of Kentucky — Affirms DUI conviction despite defendant’s denial of driving while impaired

Case
Eric Claywell v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court
Kentucky Court of Appeals
Judge
KAREM (elected 2022)
Date Decided
June 26, 2026
Docket No.
2025-CA-0524
Topics
DUI, Physical Control of Vehicle, Circumstantial Evidence
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

On September 8, 2019, Eric Claywell drove to Junction Station, a convenience store in Albany, Kentucky. He parked irregularly, pulling past the pavement until the front of his vehicle was in the grass approaching an embankment. Within minutes of his arrival, the store clerk observed Claywell staggering, smelling strongly of alcohol, and unable to operate a payment machine. Concerned he was unfit to drive, she called 911. When a police officer arrived approximately fourteen minutes later, he found Claywell in the driver’s seat with keys in the ignition and an open beer can in the cupholder. Claywell admitted to drinking but claimed someone had dropped him off and he was waiting for a pickup. He was arrested and charged with DUI, fourth offense.

Claywell testified at trial that he intentionally parked in the grass overnight, had driven to the station sober, and only began drinking after arrival when his date failed to appear. He claimed he inserted the key solely to roll down the window to speak with the officer. The jury found him guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to two years imprisonment. Claywell appealed, arguing there was insufficient evidence he operated or intended to operate his vehicle while under the influence.

The Court’s Holding

The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed Claywell’s conviction, holding that sufficient evidence supported a finding that he operated or was in physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence. The court applied the four-factor “Wells test” established in Kentucky law: whether the person was asleep or awake, whether the motor was running, the location of the vehicle and circumstances of arrival, and the person’s intent.

The court distinguished Claywell’s case from prior appellate decisions. Unlike Crosby, where the defendant’s vehicle was legally parked, Claywell parked irregularly in the grass. Unlike Woods, where the defendant admitted to drinking elsewhere, the irregular parking combined with clear signs of intoxication observed within minutes of Claywell’s arrival reasonably supported an inference he was impaired when driving to the station. The court found Claywell’s assertion that he consumed a half-pint of whisky after arrival implausible given the short timeframe, noting the officer observed no whisky bottle and detected the odor of hops rather than whisky. The court concluded it was reasonable for the jury to find him guilty based on the totality of circumstances.

Key Takeaways

  • Kentucky courts consider four non-exhaustive factors in determining whether a defendant “operated” or had “physical control” of a vehicle while impaired: wakefulness, motor status, parking location/arrival circumstances, and intent.
  • Irregular parking combined with observable signs of intoxication shortly after arrival can support an inference of impaired driving, even without a direct admission of when drinking occurred.
  • A defendant’s testimony that impairment resulted solely from drinking after arrival will be scrutinized for plausibility given the timeline and corroborating officer observations.
  • The absence of immediate re-operation of the vehicle does not negate a finding of physical control or operating while impaired.

Why It Matters

This decision reinforces that Kentucky courts will apply the Wells factors flexibly based on the totality of circumstances rather than treating any single factor as dispositive. The opinion makes clear that irregular parking, while not as dramatic as parking across two spaces or with wheels on the highway, still supports circumstantial evidence of impaired driving when coupled with observable signs of intoxication. Prosecutors can rely on this holding when the timeline between arrival and observed intoxication is brief enough to rebut claims of post-arrival drinking.

The court’s analysis also clarifies that the “intent” factor—the fourth Wells prong—is not conclusive when other evidence strongly suggests impairment at the time of operation. Defendants cannot escape DUI liability by asserting they did not intend to drive again, particularly when the evidence suggests they were already impaired upon arrival at their destination.

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