Background
Dandre Marquise Bell was arrested on June 21, 2022, for drug offenses. While that case was pending, Bell was arrested on August 9, 2022, and arraigned with a $7,500 bond set. On October 4, 2022—while awaiting trial in the drug case—Bell was sentenced to 30–60 months in prison for violating probation on an unrelated 2021 aggravated stalking conviction. While serving that sentence, Bell pled guilty to delivery or manufacture of methamphetamine. On July 12, 2024, the trial court sentenced him to 69 months to 20 years in prison (concurrent to his existing sentence) and imposed $1,608 in costs and fees, including $500 in court costs and $750 in attorney fees, with a 20% late penalty for non-payment within 56 days.
Bell appealed, claiming he was entitled to 646 days of jail credit rather than the 57 days awarded by the trial court, and that court costs, attorney fees, and the late penalty should be waived or were imposed in error. He also argued that the trial court failed to articulate a factual basis for the costs and fees and failed to conduct an ability-to-pay assessment.
The Court’s Holding
The court affirmed the trial court’s award of 57 days of jail credit, holding that MCL 769.11b’s “because of” language requires that the time served in jail be served because of the defendant’s inability to furnish bond for the offense at issue. Although Bell was unable to post bond and was incarcerated, once he was sentenced in the separate probation violation case on October 4, 2022, he was no longer being held “because of” his inability to furnish bond in the methamphetamine case. Rather, he was being held to serve his sentence in the unrelated case. The court rejected Bell’s argument that revoking his bond would have ensured additional credit, finding that such action would not have satisfied MCL 769.11b’s statutory requirements.
However, the court vacated the portions of the sentence imposing court costs and attorney fees, finding that the trial court erred by failing to articulate a factual basis for either cost. The court held that while MCL 769.1k does not require an ability-to-pay analysis before imposing costs, the costs must be shown to be “reasonably related to the actual costs incurred by the trial court.” The court also found that the trial court’s bare statement of the fee amount, without supporting findings of fact, violated the requirement established in People v. Lewis that attorney fees must have “findings of fact in support of that amount.” The court further held that once Bell signed a remittance order and subsequently contested his ability to pay the attorney fees while imprisoned, an ability-to-pay assessment became mandatory, yet the trial court provided none.
Key Takeaways
- MCL 769.11b jail credit requires not only that a defendant be unable to furnish bond, but that the time served be “because of” that inability—once a defendant begins serving a sentence on an unrelated offense, the causal nexus is broken.
- Trial courts must articulate a factual basis for court costs imposed under MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii), showing the costs are reasonably related to actual court expenses, even if individual case calculations are not required.
- Attorney fees under MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iv) must be supported by findings of fact addressing factors such as the nature and number of criminal charges, following People v. Lewis standards.
- An ability-to-pay assessment for attorney fees becomes mandatory when a remittance order is signed and a defendant later contests ability to pay, even if no such assessment was required at the time of sentencing.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies the interplay between Michigan’s jail credit statute and multiple-offense sentencing. Defense counsel should recognize that mere inability to post bond is insufficient under MCL 769.11b if the defendant’s actual confinement results from service on a sentence in an unrelated case. The decision forecloses the argument—advanced in People v. Adkins’s footnote 10—that trial courts retain discretionary authority to award additional jail credit beyond statutory limits.
The decision also reinforces procedural rigor in imposing financial sanctions at sentencing. Trial courts cannot impose court costs and attorney fees by bare statement; articulation of the factual and statutory bases is mandatory. Moreover, once a remittance order is executed and a defendant asserts inability to pay while incarcerated, the trial court must engage in a substantive ability-to-pay analysis, consider the defendant’s circumstances, and announce a reasoned decision on whether remittance should be adjusted. This requirement applies even if the court had discretion to impose the fee at sentencing without such analysis.