Background
Kyle Sanchez was convicted of a criminal offense in Cass County, North Dakota. After his conviction, his appellate attorney advised him regarding his options — pursuing a direct appeal or filing an application for postconviction relief — and following that consultation, Sanchez voluntarily dismissed his direct appeal. He subsequently filed an application for postconviction relief, which was denied, and that denial was summarily affirmed by the North Dakota Supreme Court. Sanchez v. State, 2024 ND 214, ¶ 2, 14 N.W.3d 65.
Sanchez then filed a second postconviction application arguing that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective for advising him to voluntarily dismiss his direct appeal. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the application, finding that counsel had fully consulted with Sanchez, explained both options and their relative likelihood of success, and that Sanchez made the decision to dismiss voluntarily. Sanchez appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of postconviction relief in a per curiam opinion. Applying the two-prong Strickland test, the Court upheld the district court’s factual finding that counsel consulted with Sanchez, explained his options, and that Sanchez himself chose to dismiss the appeal — findings the Court determined were not clearly erroneous.
The Court also affirmed the district court’s legal conclusion that no presumption of prejudice applies when a defendant voluntarily dismisses an existing appeal. Such a presumption is reserved for the narrow category of cases where counsel entirely fails to perfect a requested appeal, as distinguished in Middleton v. State, 2014 ND 144, ¶ 20, 849 N.W.2d 196. Because Sanchez failed to satisfy even the first prong of Strickland — that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness — the Court summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2).
Key Takeaways
- A defendant who voluntarily dismisses a direct appeal after consulting with counsel cannot later claim ineffective assistance merely because the strategic choice proved unfavorable — no presumption of prejudice arises in that scenario.
- The prejudice presumption recognized in cases where counsel fails to perfect a requested appeal does not extend to situations where the defendant affirmatively chose to forgo the appeal following informed consultation.
- To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim in this context, a postconviction applicant must satisfy both prongs of Strickland: deficient performance and actual prejudice — neither is presumed.
Why It Matters
This decision reaffirms the boundaries of the narrow presumed-prejudice rule in appellate ineffective assistance claims. Defense counsel who thoroughly consult with clients about the pros and cons of pursuing a direct appeal versus postconviction relief — and document that the client made an informed, voluntary choice — are well-insulated from later ineffectiveness challenges.
For practitioners, the case underscores the importance of memorializing plea-stage and appeal-stage strategy discussions with clients. When a client voluntarily waives a direct appeal, that informed choice will be treated as the client’s own strategic decision, not a deficiency attributable to counsel, so long as the consultation meets an objective standard of reasonableness.