Background
Ashley Anderson, a licensed clinical social worker employed by Central Minnesota Health Center since 2013, called the Stearns County Jail in September 2024 to inform medical staff about her brother Austin’s diabetes complications while he was detained on outstanding warrants. She made the call on speakerphone in the presence of her mother and brother Adam, without mentioning her professional credentials.
In October 2024, Ashley received notice that the Minnesota Board of Social Work had initiated an investigation based on a complaint submitted by Adam through the board’s online complaint form. Adam falsely identified himself as a licensed social worker and insurer, and alleged that Ashley had improperly accessed confidential warrant information, obtained unauthorized access to health records, impersonated their mother with medical providers, and abused her position as a social worker.
Ashley sued for defamation, defamation per se, and civil conspiracy. The defendants moved to dismiss under Minnesota’s Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), the state’s anti-SLAPP statute adopted in 2024. The district court granted the motion and dismissed all claims with prejudice.
The Court’s Holding
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Adam’s report to the licensing board constitutes a “communication in a governmental proceeding” under UPEPA section 554.08(b)(1), bringing the defamation claims within the statute’s scope. The court rejected Ashley’s argument that only communications made during ongoing proceedings qualify, reasoning that such an interpretation would render section 554.08(b)(2)—which covers communications on issues “under consideration or review” in governmental proceedings—superfluous.
The court further held that Ashley failed to establish a prima facie case for defamation because she did not adequately allege that Adam’s statements harmed her reputation in the community. The court found Ashley’s conclusory allegations of reputational harm insufficient and noted she failed to explain how a private report to the board would impact public perception absent disciplinary action, which had not occurred. Ashley also failed to show any applicable exception to UPEPA or to allege that Adam knew his statements were false, defeating her reliance on the criminal-defamation exception.
Critically, the court held that UPEPA is constitutional as applied because it does not require district courts to make pretrial factual findings, unlike Minnesota’s previous anti-SLAPP statute struck down in Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minnesota (2017). UPEPA merely provides an accelerated procedure using existing summary-judgment and motion-to-dismiss standards without imposing heightened burdens of proof or usurping the jury’s role.
Key Takeaways
- Reports to state licensing boards that initiate investigations are “communications in governmental proceedings” protected by UPEPA, even if submitted through online complaint forms.
- Plaintiffs must allege specific, non-conclusory facts showing that allegedly defamatory statements actually harmed their reputation in the community; bare allegations of reputational injury are insufficient to survive UPEPA motions.
- UPEPA does not unconstitutionally burden jury trial rights because it does not require courts to make factual findings or impose heightened burdens of proof.
- Private communications to administrative agencies can qualify for UPEPA protection if they relate to matters of public concern or are addressed to governmental bodies.
Why It Matters
This is the first major Minnesota appellate interpretation of UPEPA since its adoption in 2024, providing critical guidance for healthcare professionals, social workers, and others subject to complaints filed with licensing boards. The decision establishes that such complaints receive anti-SLAPP protection if they concern matters of public concern—a broad category that likely encompasses most professional misconduct allegations. The holding significantly raises the bar for defamation plaintiffs, requiring concrete factual allegations of community harm rather than boilerplate conclusions, and it eliminates the primary constitutional objection that plagued the statute’s predecessor.
For practitioners, the decision clarifies that UPEPA applies early and aggressively in litigation, allowing defendants to obtain expedited dismissals without extensive discovery. For complainants and licensing boards, it confirms that complaint procedures receive the full protection of anti-SLAPP statutes, insulating good-faith reports from defamation liability absent extraordinary circumstances.