Background
On December 29, 2020, Martin McGuinniss went snow tubing with his family at Campgaw Mountain Ski Area in New Jersey. Before participating, he signed a release acknowledging that snow tubing is inherently dangerous. On his third run down the tubing hill, McGuinniss descended headfirst lying flat on his snow tube, a permitted riding position. While descending, he struck a deceleration mat—a rubber mat placed in the lane to slow tubers—that he described as “bunched up.” The impact catapulted him from the tube, causing him to land on his left shoulder and sustain a comminuted fracture of his clavicle.
McGuinniss did not alert Campgaw employees about the bunched-up mat at the time. He left the facility without reporting the incident to staff, returned the following day after consulting a lawyer, and filed an incident report. Discovery revealed that Campgaw had documented 45 incidents involving snow tubers and deceleration mats in the two winter seasons preceding McGuinniss’s accident, though no evidence indicated any of these involved bunched-up mats.
McGuinniss filed suit against Campgaw and related defendants, alleging common law negligence and violations of the Ski Act. The trial court denied Campgaw’s motion for summary judgment, finding the Ski Act inapplicable to snow tubing because snow tubes lack steering and braking mechanisms. Campgaw appealed; the New Jersey Supreme Court summarily remanded to the Appellate Division to address the novel question of whether the Ski Act applies to snow tubing.
The Court’s Holding
The Appellate Division reversed the trial court and granted summary judgment to Campgaw on all claims. The court held that the Ski Act applies to snow tubing activities. The statute defines “skiers” to include persons “utilizing the ski area for recreational purposes such as skiing or operating toboggans, sleds or similar vehicles.” The court concluded that snow tubes constitute “similar vehicles” within this definition because they are used for snow-based recreational activities, subject to the same variables as traditional skiing and sledding—including surface conditions, ice, pitch, speed, and weather. Critically, the court rejected the argument that lack of mechanical control over steering or braking rendered snow tubing “fundamentally different,” noting that riders can control speed by dragging their feet and control direction by shifting weight or pushing off side berms. The court emphasized that controlling one’s vehicle is not a requirement for Ski Act protection, as most sleds and toboggans similarly lack steering and braking mechanisms.
Having determined the Ski Act applies, the court examined whether Campgaw violated its statutory duty to remove “obvious, man-made hazards” as soon as practicable. Under the statute, an operator is not liable unless it had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazardous condition and reasonable time to remedy it. McGuinniss could not establish actual notice: he testified the bunched-up mat became visible only when he was 20 to 30 feet away and moving too fast to stop. McGuinniss also failed to establish constructive notice: although 45 prior incidents had been documented, no evidence showed any involved bunched-up mats, that the mats had a propensity to bunch, or what preventive measures might have been feasible. Campgaw’s expert opinion—uncontroverted because McGuinniss’s expert declined to opine on Ski Act applicability—established that deceleration mats are necessary equipment and were clearly visible.
Key Takeaways
- New Jersey’s Ski Act extends to snow tubing as a “similar vehicle” under the statute’s definitions, not merely to skiing and sledding in their traditional forms.
- A participant’s inability to mechanically control speed or steering does not disqualify an activity from Ski Act protection; riders retain practical ability to control movement through body position and drag.
- Operator liability under the Ski Act requires proof of actual or constructive notice of a hazardous condition and reasonable opportunity to remedy it; mere speculation about prior incidents is insufficient to create a jury question.
- Deceleration mats placed to slow tubers are “equipment necessary for ordinary operation” under the statute and are not inherent risks for which operators bear liability absent notice of a specific defect.
Why It Matters
This decision significantly impacts the snow tubing industry by bringing that activity within the protective framework of New Jersey’s Ski Act. Rather than exposure to open-ended common law negligence liability, tubing operators now receive the Act’s carefully calibrated protections—which bar suits for inherent risks and equipment necessary for operation. The ruling clarifies that the statutory phrase “similar vehicles” encompasses activities beyond traditional skiing, reflecting the Legislature’s intent to protect the viability of winter recreational businesses generally, not skiing in isolation.
For participants, the decision narrows available avenues for recovery. The court’s interpretation demands proof of operator knowledge—actual or constructive—of a specific hazard, not merely that an accident occurred. The decision also rejects form-over-substance arguments: even though tubers cannot steer or brake their tubes, this practical reality does not distinguish snow tubing from sledding or tobogganing, activities plainly covered by the statute since 1979. This holding will likely influence how courts across jurisdictions interpret recreational activity immunity statutes when new sports or variants emerge.