Background
On October 20, 2023, Shelter Mutual Insurance Company filed suit against Dajuan Henry Jones and Antwoine Jenkins for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident on May 13, 2022. SMIC, as subrogee of the insured, alleged that Jones negligently operated Jenkins’s vehicle and struck the insured’s legally parked car, resulting in $12,107.71 in damages ($11,607.71 paid by SMIC to the insured, $500 out-of-pocket loss to the insured). The summons and complaint were served via certified mail to “Dajuan Jones” at “701 Stonelick Woods, Batavia, OH” on October 25, 2023.
Jones did not respond within the required 28 days. On December 4, 2023, SMIC moved for default judgment, averring that Jones was properly served but never filed an answer or requested an extension. The trial court granted the motion on December 5, 2023, entering judgment for $12,107.71. More than sixteen months later, on July 3, 2025, Jones filed a motion under Civil Rule 60(B) to vacate the default, claiming improper service and lack of actual notice. He asserted he did not learn of the action until February 9, 2024, and argued he had been wrongly identified—SMIC allegedly used an expired identification from someone named “Dejuan” (a different spelling) rather than his legal name “Dajuan Henry Jones, Sr.” Jones also submitted a criminal acquittal from a separate trial for Failure to Stop After Accident, claiming a meritorious defense. The trial court granted Jones’s motion on September 5, 2025, without explanation.
SMIC appealed, raising three assignments of error: (1) the trial court erred in setting aside the default without Jones providing an affidavit contradicting the presumption of proper service, (2) the decision lacked evidentiary support, and (3) the motion was untimely, filed more than one year after the default judgment was entered.
The Court’s Holding
The First District Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Zayas, sustained all three assignments of error and reversed the trial court’s judgment. The court established a critical two-part framework: First, it recognized that a default judgment rendered without proper service is void, and a court has inherent power to vacate such a void judgment without satisfying Civ.R. 60(B) requirements. However, even when a defendant claims improper service—invoking the court’s inherent authority—evidence must be presented to support such assertions. The unsworn driver’s license Jones submitted, combined with his bare allegations about the address, was insufficient to grant the motion outright. Consequently, the court held that Jones’s allegations of improper service were sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing on that narrow issue, and remanded for such a hearing.
Second, the court addressed Jones’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion based on lack of actual notice. The court held that Jones’s motion was untimely under the “reasonable time” requirement independent of whether the motion fell under Civ.R. 60(B)(1)–(4) or the excusable-neglect provision of 60(B)(5). Jones admitted he became aware of the default judgment on February 9, 2024, yet did not file his motion until July 3, 2025—over sixteen months later and eighteen months after the December 5, 2023 default judgment. The court found no reasonable explanation for this delay and noted that even mistaken-identity claims under 60(B)(5) must be timely filed. Citing Doddridge v. Fitzpatrick, 53 Ohio St.2d 9 (1978), the court observed that relief under 60(B) based on lack of actual notice was properly denied when filed well outside a year.
The court distinguished between improper service (jurisdictional, cognizable through the court’s inherent authority and warranting an evidentiary hearing) and lack of actual notice (properly brought under 60(B) but subject to the timeliness requirement). On remand, the trial court is directed to: (1) deny Jones’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion as untimely, and (2) hold an evidentiary hearing solely on Jones’s assertion that service was improper.
Key Takeaways
- A default judgment rendered without proper service is void, but a defendant seeking to vacate on service grounds must present credible evidence, not mere unsworn assertions or conclusory allegations.
- A defendant asserting improper service may invoke the trial court’s inherent power to vacate, but an evidentiary hearing is required when factual disputes over service exist.
- Motions under Civ.R. 60(B) must be filed within a reasonable time; a sixteen-month delay from the date a defendant learned of a default judgment, with no explanation, is unreasonable as a matter of law.
- The distinction between improper service (which attacks jurisdiction) and lack of actual notice (which does not) determines the legal framework and remedies available to a defaulted defendant.
- Mistaken-identity claims, even if characterized as excusable neglect under Civ.R. 60(B)(5), remain subject to the timeliness requirement and do not bypass it.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies the procedural hurdles for defendants challenging default judgments in Ohio state court. It reaffirms that defendants have substantive rights to contest defaults on service grounds, but those rights are not self-executing—they require timely action and evidentiary support. Trial courts cannot simply grant broad relief based on conclusory allegations. The opinion reinforces that a default judgment, while disfavored, cannot be vacated years after entry without legitimate explanation, preventing the indefinite reopening of settled judgments.
For insurance companies and creditors, the decision confirms that properly documented service (such as certified mail receipts) creates a presumption courts will respect unless rebutted by specific, sworn evidence. For defendants, the message is clear: any challenge to a default judgment must be prompt and supported by affidavits, depositions, or other sworn evidence. A criminal acquittal on a related charge and unsupported allegations of mistaken identity do not suffice. The case underscores that Ohio courts will enforce the timeliness bar strictly, particularly when a defendant admits actual knowledge of the default but inexplicably delays filing relief.