Background
In July 2020, the South Kingstown School Committee created the BIPOC Advisory Board, facilitated by Nonviolent Schools Rhode Island (NSRI), in response to community concerns about racial inequity in the district’s disciplinary policies and the lack of diversity among staff. The school committee allocated $5,000 for NSRI to facilitate twenty-five meetings from February through August 2021. The Board’s stated mission was to “advocate for equity in the education of students who identify as BIPOC” and to review school policies through a lens of inclusivity.
In May 2021, plaintiff Nicole Solas requested permission to attend Board meetings. NSRI director Robin Wildman denied the request, explaining that the Board’s meetings were not open to the public and that initial membership was limited to BIPOC-identifying community members to facilitate safe spaces for sharing personal experiences. Solas filed an administrative complaint with the Rhode Island Attorney General, alleging the Board violated the Open Meetings Act (OMA) by operating as a closed public body. The Attorney General concluded the Board was not a public body. Undeterred, Solas sued in Superior Court seeking declaratory relief that the Board’s actions be deemed null and void.
The Superior Court granted the school committee’s motion for summary judgment, finding the Board was analogous to a compensation review committee in prior case law and lacked independent veto or voting power. The Board submitted suggestions to the Policy Subcommittee, which then deliberated and made discretionary decisions about what to present to the full School Committee—a process that provided the public two opportunities to object at open meetings. Solas appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BIPOC Advisory Board is not a “public body” within the meaning of the OMA and therefore its meetings were not required to be open to the public. The court applied the precedent framework from Solas v. Emergency Hiring Council of the State (2001), which identified four factors: (1) how the entity was created; (2) the consistency of its meetings; (3) the composition and appointment of members; and (4) whether the entity exercised advisory power with veto authority over matters of significant public interest.
The Board failed to satisfy the test. Although addressing matters of public interest (racial equity in schools), the Board was an amorphous, ad hoc group of volunteers—not a formal government subdivision. Membership was voluntary and inconsistent, beginning with approximately fifteen members who recruited others “by word of mouth” and declining to seven or eight. Members received no compensation or benefits. The Board did not operate under charter, bylaws, or formal agendas; NSRI created rules informally. Unlike the Emergency Hiring Council, Board members were not appointed public officials. Critically, the Board exercised no veto power. It submitted policy suggestions to the Policy Subcommittee, which could accept, reject, or request reconsideration—and the School Committee retained final discretionary authority. Both decision-making bodies held open meetings where the public could object.
The court rejected Solas’s argument that the Board possessed advisory power because two Board members could occupy reserved seats on the Policy Subcommittee. Those seats were not established positions for particular members; they were open to any volunteer Board member available to attend, distinguishing this from the appointed positions in prior case law. The court also rejected the claim that using a third-party vendor circumvented the OMA, finding instead that the Board’s structure and lack of binding authority placed it outside the statute’s reach.
Key Takeaways
- An advisory group addressing matters of significant public interest is not a “public body” subject to the OMA if it lacks regular meetings, consistent membership, formal structure, or binding authority.
- Advisory power alone is insufficient to trigger the OMA; the group must exercise supervisory or veto power, or at minimum advisory power with meaningful decision-making authority.
- When an advisory board’s recommendations feed into a formal review process conducted by public bodies holding open meetings, the public has adequate transparency opportunities to object and remain informed.
- Using a third-party vendor or consultant to facilitate a group does not, by itself, shield it from public meetings requirements, but informal structure and lack of formal authority support a finding that it is not a public body.
Why It Matters
This decision significantly clarifies the boundary between informal advisory groups and formal “public bodies” under Rhode Island’s Open Meetings Act. While the OMA is broadly construed to favor public access, entities must satisfy concrete structural requirements—regular meetings, consistent membership, formal appointment processes, and genuine decision-making authority—to fall within its scope. The ruling allows school committees and other government bodies to create informal community advisory groups, including affinity spaces designed to facilitate candid discussion among specific constituencies, without triggering open-meetings obligations, provided that final decision-making occurs in transparent forums.
For practitioners and government entities, the decision provides practical guidance: advisory committees with volunteer membership, no formal appointment or veto power, and recommendations subject to discretionary review by formal public bodies are unlikely to qualify as public bodies. However, entities must ensure that the formal decision-making process itself—where advisory recommendations are deliberated—remains open to the public. The court’s reasoning also implies limits to this principle: a group with more formal structure, regular meetings, appointed members, and genuine authority could cross the threshold, even if it remains technically advisory.