Background
Zion Charleston was charged with misdemeanor domestic violence on April 25, 2025, following an altercation with J.A., the mother of his child. A bench trial was held on July 16, 2025. During the trial, while J.A. was testifying, Charleston informed his attorney that he wanted new counsel, claiming insufficient communication and inadequate preparation. The trial court denied his oral motion as untimely, noting that jeopardy had attached and that Charleston’s attorney was experienced and seemingly prepared. The court found Charleston guilty and sentenced him to 180 days in jail with credit for 20 days time served. The sentence expired on December 23, 2025.
Charleston filed a notice of appeal on August 4, 2025. On January 13, 2026, the State moved to dismiss the appeal as moot, arguing that because Charleston’s sentence had expired and there were no collateral consequences, there was no justiciable controversy remaining. The appellate court overruled the mootness motion on February 9, 2026, directing the parties to address the issue in their briefs.
The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on both issues presented. First, regarding mootness, the court held that although Charleston’s sentence had expired, the appeal was not moot because the misdemeanor domestic violence conviction carries a substantial collateral legal consequence: the federal firearm restriction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). This federal statute bars anyone convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from possessing firearms or ammunition in interstate commerce. The court found this restriction constitutes a cognizable collateral consequence that prevents Charleston from exercising his Second Amendment rights and justifies appellate review despite the sentence’s expiration.
Second, the court rejected Charleston’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for new counsel. The court noted that while Charleston’s right to counsel of his choice is protected by the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees effective representation rather than the lawyer of his preference. Examining the timeliness of the motion (made mid-trial after jeopardy attached) and whether attorney-client conflict prevented adequate defense, the court found neither factor supported reversal. Charleston’s attorney had met with him twice, reviewed the State’s plea offer and discovery evidence, inquired about potential witnesses, and was described by the prosecutor as capable and experienced. The court found no breakdown in communication sufficient to warrant replacing counsel.