Background
Bravon K. was born in March 2018 to Kayla K. When Bravon was two years old—nonverbal, malnourished, with severe tooth decay, and inadequately vaccinated—Tennessee Department of Children’s Services removed him from his mother’s custody in March 2020 following a referral alleging drug exposure. The father, Jermale H., had been indicted in January 2019 for serious drug and weapons offenses committed in January 2018, before Bravon’s birth. At the time of removal, the father had not established paternity. DCS placed Bravon with foster parents and created a permanency plan requiring the father to complete paternity testing, obtain drug assessment, establish suitable housing with DCS verification, maintain employment, avoid criminal charges, and complete a parenting assessment. The father’s DNA testing confirmed paternity in June 2020, but that same month he was incarcerated for three felony convictions (drug possession and weapons offenses) and a misdemeanor domestic assault charge. He remained incarcerated until June 2021. DCS filed a petition to terminate parental rights in February 2021 while the father was still incarcerated.
At trial in 2023–2024, the trial court heard testimony from 17 witnesses, including the father, DCS representatives, visitation supervisors, the paternal aunt and uncle seeking intervention, and a licensed psychologist. The evidence showed the father had seven children with different mothers but had never been the primary caregiver for any of them. While incarcerated, he had approximately 20 phone calls with Bravon over 12 months. After release, he maintained inconsistent weekly two-hour supervised visits; Bravon called him “the visit guy” and was reluctant to attend. The father claimed employment at a temp agency but could not provide verifiable paychecks showing hours or wages. After his release, he lived in a halfway house (evicted for curfew violation), then with a romantic partner, then briefly in an apartment in Shelbyville (lost due to re-arrest), and finally with his fiancée Ms. McGill—where he lived for 18 months but on an oral lease arrangement with no written documentation and with Ms. McGill as sole tenant.
The trial court found three grounds for termination proven by clear and convincing evidence: (1) abandonment by incarcerated parent/wanton disregard under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv); (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody under § 36-1-113(g)(14). The court also found termination was in Bravon’s best interest and entered an order terminating the father’s parental rights with DCS retaining full guardianship. The father appealed, as did the paternal aunt and uncle regarding the denial of their motion to intervene.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed on all grounds. First, regarding the aunt and uncle’s motion to intervene: Under Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 24.02, permissive intervention does not require an evidentiary hearing or findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court properly denied the motion without such procedural formalities. The court noted that intervention as of right requires statutory authorization, which the relatives did not claim, and permissive intervention under Rule 24.02 can be granted only if a common question of law or fact exists—which the aunt and uncle failed to adequately establish on appeal.
Second, regarding abandonment: Father was incarcerated from June 2020 through June 2021, which encompassed the four-month period immediately preceding the February 2021 termination petition filing. Under § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), abandonment occurs when a parent is incarcerated during this period and “engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child.” The father’s conduct satisfied this standard: he pleaded guilty to serious felony drug and weapons offenses committed in January 2018 while Bravon was in utero; he tested positive for THC and cocaine in May and June 2020 after Bravon’s birth; he pleaded guilty to misdemeanor domestic assault stemming from a May 2020 incident with the child’s mother; and he was charged with additional drug-related activities in 2022. The incarceration itself is not the ground for termination, but the statute recognizes parental incarceration as a strong indicator that child welfare may be threatened, allowing courts to examine overall circumstances. The combined effect of the father’s criminal history, substance abuse, and inability to be present for his child constituted wanton disregard.
Third, regarding substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan: Although the father completed some requirements (establishing paternity, maintaining contact with DCS, gaining employment, exercising visitation), he failed substantially on housing—a critical requirement directly related to the conditions necessitating foster care. The father lived with Ms. McGill for more than 18 months but never provided written lease verification or other proof of his right to reside there. More troubling, Ms. McGill was the sole tenant, the father claimed an oral arrangement, and he explicitly told DCS he did not want Ms. McGill or the landlord involved in proceedings. Ms. McGill never testified despite many hearings, and the father admitted she would be the primary caregiver for Bravon while he worked—yet Bravon was a stranger to her and the father had not discussed his custody plans with her. Uncertainty regarding stable, suitable housing for Bravon is not a minor deviation but a substantial deficiency in a critical permanency plan requirement. Fourth, regarding failure to manifest ability and willingness to assume custody: The father never demonstrated adaptability, flexibility, or proactive parenting. His visits with Bravon were inconsistent in quality; sometimes engaged, sometimes merely observant while Bravon played alone. The bond between them did not improve over time, and when asked about Bravon’s interests and preferences, the father often had no answer. The father had seven other children but had never been the sole or primary caregiver for any of them—all childcare responsibilities fell on others. He never requested increased or unsupervised visitation. This pattern established that placing Bravon in his custody would pose a substantial risk of harm to the child’s psychological welfare, not because the father would deliberately abuse the child, but because he had demonstrated no capacity to provide proactive, independent parental care for any child.
Key Takeaways
- Abandonment by an incarcerated parent requires proof that the parent was incarcerated during the four-month period preceding the termination petition and engaged in pre-incarceration conduct exhibiting wanton disregard—not mere criminal history alone, but conduct showing disregard for the child’s welfare.
- Permissive intervention under Rule 24.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure does not require an evidentiary hearing, findings of fact, or conclusions of law; the trial court has discretion to grant or deny such motions without formal procedural requirements.
- Failure to provide verifiable proof of suitable housing, particularly when the parent resides on an oral lease arrangement and the non-tenant caregiver refuses to participate in DCS proceedings, constitutes substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan.
- Parental inability to provide independent, proactive care—demonstrated by a pattern of relying on others for childcare across multiple children—can support termination even absent evidence of active abuse or neglect.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies Tennessee law on abandonment by incarcerated parents and reinforces that incarceration combined with pre-incarceration conduct showing wanton disregard provides a clear statutory basis for termination. The opinion emphasizes that courts need not confine their examination to the four-month period immediately preceding incarceration but may examine the parent’s overall conduct and criminal history. For practitioners, the case confirms that housing verification is not a technical requirement but a substantial component of any permanency plan aimed at reunification, and that a parent’s failure to secure verifiable housing can alone support termination if the requirement was reasonable and related to remedying conditions necessitating foster care.
The decision also has procedural significance: it clarifies that third parties seeking to intervene in termination actions must satisfy the Rule 24.02 standard for permissive intervention and need not receive an evidentiary hearing. This limits opportunities for relatives to participate in proceedings unless they establish a direct legal or factual interest in the case. Additionally, the court’s analysis of the ability-and-willingness prong underscores that parental unfitness is not limited to active abuse or neglect but extends to demonstrated incapacity for independent, proactive parenting—a standard that may prove significant in cases involving parents with substance abuse histories, multiple children, or persistent reliance on others for childcare.