Background
Leif Buck was convicted of interfering with the reporting of domestic violence under RCW 9A.36.150 after he assaulted the mother of his children at his residence. When the victim stated she would call the sheriff, Buck took her cell phone to prevent the call. The victim later drove to the sheriff’s office to report the incident and sought medical treatment for her injuries.
At trial, the jury instruction required the State to prove Buck “prevented or attempted to prevent [the victim] from calling a 911 emergency communication system, or obtaining medical assistance, or making a report to any law enforcement officer.” Buck’s defense argued this constituted an alternative means crime, requiring jury unanimity on which specific means he committed—relying on a Division One Court of Appeals holding in State v. Nonog. However, Division Three of the Court of Appeals had rejected this view, creating a direct conflict requiring Supreme Court resolution.
The State conceded that if interference were an alternative means crime, Buck’s conviction would be invalid because evidence was not presented to support all three alleged means. Division Three affirmed the conviction anyway, holding that interference is not an alternative means crime.
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court unanimously held that RCW 9A.36.150(1)(b) defines a single crime of interfering with reporting domestic violence, not three alternative means of committing separate crimes. The court rejected Division One’s prior holding in Nonog and affirmed Division Three’s judgment.
The court’s analysis centered on the focus of Washington’s alternative means doctrine: the defendant’s criminal conduct. Applying precedent from Sandholm, the court reasoned that the statute’s references to different reporting methods (911 calls, medical assistance, law enforcement reports) describe the actions of victims or witnesses, not the defendant’s conduct. Since only the interference itself is criminalized—and the defendant’s interfering conduct is identical regardless of which reporting method the victim chooses—these are merely different factual circumstances for a single crime, not distinct criminal means.
The court emphasized that most alternative means cases involve statutes directly criminalizing defendant behavior. Here, by contrast, the alleged alternatives concern victim or witness conduct, which is not criminalized. The court declined to apply the traditional Arndt factors for identifying alternative means because those factors are designed for statutes criminalizing defendant conduct. Protecting jury unanimity rights—the constitutional foundation for the alternative means doctrine—requires focus on what the defendant did, not what the victim did.
Key Takeaways
- Interfering with reporting domestic violence is a single-means crime requiring no jury unanimity among different methods of interference.
- The alternative means doctrine focuses exclusively on the defendant’s criminal conduct; references to victim or witness conduct do not create alternative means.
- The Washington Supreme Court overruled Division One’s prior holding in Nonog, which had been questioned by subsequent appellate decisions.
- Prosecutors need present evidence of only one method of interference—the core criminal conduct remains constant regardless of how the victim attempts to report.
Why It Matters
This decision resolves critical uncertainty in prosecuting interference with reporting of domestic violence charges. By clarifying that the statute creates a single crime rather than alternative means, the court eliminates the risk that convictions will be overturned on jury unanimity grounds. The holding provides prosecutors with straightforward charging and jury instruction procedures, allowing them to focus on proving the interference itself without needing to obtain jury unanimity on which specific reporting method the victim used.
The decision also articulates a broader principle distinguishing statutes that criminalize defendant conduct (which may have alternative means) from those that criminalize interference with victim or witness conduct (which do not). This distinction will likely influence how courts interpret other interference statutes and victimization-related crimes. The court’s refocus on the distinctiveness of the defendant’s criminal conduct—over linguistic features like the disjunctive “or”—reinforces recent precedent and provides clearer guidance for future alternative means analysis in Washington criminal law.