Background
Jeffrey Rivard sued the Town of Brattleboro and municipal employees over two trespass orders. The first barred him from his child’s school; the second prohibited him from the police department property. Both orders stated that recipients could appeal within fourteen days by calling the town manager. Rivard alleged he called to appeal but received no response, claiming the town violated his due-process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by ignoring his appeals.
The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, reasoning that the trespass order marked the school as private property, and the appeal process applied only to public property. Therefore, Rivard had no claim regarding the school. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed this decision in November 2025, and Rivard did not challenge the school-trespass dismissal in that appeal.
In January 2026, Rivard moved for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b), claiming “newly discovered evidence” that the officer knew the school was public but falsely marked it private on the order. He also alleged misrepresentation when detained (being told he faced a felony charge when it was actually a misdemeanor), and moved to take judicial notice of the school’s public status and to amend his complaint.
The Court’s Holding
The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of all relief. The court held that Rivard had not shown judicial error warranting Rule 60(b) relief because the alleged “mistake”—that the school was marked as private property—originated from the trespass order that Rivard himself had attached to his pleadings. This was not a judicial error but rather a fact introduced into the record by plaintiff.
The court further held that Rivard failed to satisfy the requirements for relief based on newly discovered evidence. Rule 60(b)(2) requires the party to explain why the evidence could not have been discovered earlier through due diligence. Rivard provided no such explanation for why he could not have corrected the alleged error sooner. He also failed to demonstrate fraud or misconduct by defendants under Rule 60(b)(3).
Finally, the court rejected Rivard’s request to amend his complaint, noting that once a final judgment has been entered, a plaintiff no longer has a right to amend under Rule 15. The court found Rivard’s arguments inadequately briefed where he challenged the trial court’s vexatious-litigation finding.
Key Takeaways
- Parties bear responsibility for facts stated in their own pleadings; a party cannot obtain relief from judgment based on alleged errors that the party introduced into the record.
- Rule 60(b) relief for newly discovered evidence requires the moving party to explain why the evidence could not have been obtained earlier through due diligence.
- Once final judgment is entered, plaintiffs lose the right to amend their complaint under Rule 15.
- Trial courts have broad discretion in ruling on Rule 60(b) motions, and appellate courts will reverse only for clear abuse of discretion.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces important procedural limits on post-judgment relief. It illustrates that courts will not reopen cases based on information parties could have raised or corrected in earlier proceedings, and that litigants cannot shift responsibility for inaccuracies in their own filings to judicial error. The ruling also clarifies that once judgment becomes final, the opportunity to amend generally closes, and any attempt to do so through post-judgment motions will be rejected.
For practitioners, the case underscores the importance of careful pleading and the burden placed on parties to conduct due diligence before trial. It also demonstrates courts’ wariness of allowing repeated attempts to relitigate matters through successive motions, particularly where a party has had prior appellate opportunity to raise claims but chose not to.