Background
Luis Adrián Cortés-Ramos sued Ricky Martin (Enrique Martin-Morales) for copyright infringement arising from a 2013 SuperSong contest co-sponsored by Sony and Martin. Cortés submitted an original song and music video in January 2014 and was selected as a finalist after signing contest documents and affidavits. Cortés alleges that Martin’s April 2014 release of “Vida” copied his submission. This is Cortés’s fifth appeal over twelve years in cases arising from the same core facts.
Cortés initially failed to register his copyright before suing, which was a barrier under Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com. He later registered the copyright in 2017 and refiled suit, alleging both copyright infringement and fraudulent inducement. Martin moved for summary judgment, arguing that Cortés had assigned all rights to Sony through the contest documents.
The district court denied Cortés’s repeated requests for discovery and a scheduling conference, instead setting a summary judgment deadline just over one month away. The magistrate judge recommended granting Martin’s motion, and the district court adopted that recommendation in full, also invalidating Cortés’s copyright registration. Cortés appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The First Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the district court erred by granting summary judgment without affording Cortés adequate opportunity for discovery. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), when a party claims inability to respond to summary judgment due to incomplete discovery, the court must consider whether to defer the motion, deny it, allow time for discovery, or issue other appropriate relief. Though Cortés never formally invoked Rule 56(d) by name, his motion for reconsideration and continued discovery requests reasonably constituted a Rule 56(d)-style plea that the district court should have addressed.
The court noted that Cortés faced particular hardship because Martin (and co-defendant Sony) controlled all relevant evidence. The district court’s decision to skip discovery “to avoid unnecessary litigation” conflicted with Rule 56(d)’s protective purpose. Additionally, Cortés never actually invoked the district court’s jurisdiction by attempting the required Rule 26(f) conference, and the magistrate judge’s rejection of Cortés’s discovery claims was based partly on this failure—yet the district court then denied Cortés’s explicit request for a scheduling conference that would have triggered such a conference. This procedural posture warranted remand to allow discovery before final adjudication of summary judgment.
On the jurisdictional argument, the court rejected Cortés’s claim that an arbitration agreement between him and Sony divested the court of jurisdiction over his suit against Martin. An arbitration agreement does not divest courts of jurisdiction, and Martin is not bound by Cortés’s agreement with Sony. The court noted, however, that issue preclusion could apply between future arbitration and judicial proceedings, depending on how this case resolves on remand.
Key Takeaways
- A district court cannot grant summary judgment while a party still lacks essential discovery, even when the party has not formally invoked Rule 56(d) by name, if the party’s motions reasonably constitute a Rule 56(d)-style plea.
- Rule 56(d) exists as a safeguard against premature summary judgment and must be meaningfully considered when a party claims the opposing party controls critical evidence.
- An arbitration agreement between a plaintiff and a third party does not divest courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over claims against a different defendant who is not party to the arbitration clause.
- On remand, the substantive issues—whether Cortés assigned his copyright to Sony through the contest documents and whether he consented to those terms—remain to be resolved, potentially with the benefit of discovery.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that summary judgment cannot be granted as a speed mechanism to avoid discovery when one party controls the evidence. The court’s holding that informal Rule 56(d) pleas merit meaningful consideration—without requiring formal rule citations—protects litigants who may lack sophisticated procedural counsel. The case also clarifies that arbitration clauses between nonsignatory defendants and plaintiffs do not automatically divest federal courts of jurisdiction, an important principle for complex commercial disputes involving multiple parties.
For copyright practitioners, the remand restores Cortés’s opportunity to develop factual support for his claims through discovery. The court’s emphasis on unequal access to evidence—particularly Sony’s control over contest documentation that Cortés did not initially receive—signals that courts must respect Rule 56(d) protections even in cases spanning multiple appeals and apparent procedural inertia by the plaintiff.