Background
Herman Tarnow, a lawyer, was found liable by a New York jury for the wrongful termination of his former employee Theodora Benedict. Following Benedict’s death, her estate’s representative, Richard Watson, obtained a judgment against Tarnow for $352,817.97, comprising back pay, emotional distress damages, and pre-judgment interest. Watson domesticated the New York judgment in Collier County, Florida, by recording it under the Florida Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (FEFJA), §§ 55.501–55.509, Fla. Stat.
Tarnow filed an action in Collier County challenging the judgment’s validity on multiple grounds, including extrinsic fraud. He sought to set aside the recording of the judgment and requested injunctive relief to stay its enforcement. Watson moved to dismiss, arguing that Tarnow had failed to comply with FEFJA § 55.509 requirements, which include filing a lis pendens within 30 days of the judgment’s recording and posting a supersedeas bond. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice, ordering Tarnow to comply with § 55.509 or face dismissal with prejudice. When Tarnow did not amend his complaint to satisfy these conditions, the trial court dismissed his action with prejudice.
The Sixth District reversed, holding that FEFJA § 55.509’s procedural requirements for staying enforcement of a judgment are distinct from the right to commence an action challenging the judgment’s validity. The court emphasized that § 55.509 provides mechanisms for a judgment debtor to obtain or maintain a stay of enforcement—specifically by filing a lis pendens within 30 days and posting security as required by the court. However, these conditions are not prerequisites for filing an action to challenge the judgment itself.
The court noted that FEFJA’s purpose was to provide an efficient method of domesticating foreign judgments without filing a separate action, but the statute contemplates that judgment debtors may initiate litigation to challenge validity. A judgment debtor can file an action challenging a domesticated judgment more than 30 days after recording and without seeking a stay of enforcement under § 55.509. The failure to satisfy stay conditions means the debtor will not obtain a stay, but it does not bar the debtor from having his day in court on the merits of the challenge.
The trial court therefore erred in conditioning Tarnow’s right to maintain his action on compliance with § 55.509’s stay requirements. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, noting that it did not reach the substantive sufficiency of Tarnow’s extrinsic fraud or other challenges to the judgment’s validity.