Background
Father initiated a custody proceeding in November 2023 regarding his minor child, K.L.D., born in 2008. The parties reached a shared parenting agreement in December 2023, memorialized through court order. Father consistently used the same address (4233 W. 23rd St., Cleveland) throughout all prior proceedings and appeared at every scheduled mediation and hearing.
In May 2025, the Office of Child Support Services (OCSS) filed a motion to intervene and establish child support. Without explanation, OCSS served father at a different address (10937 Pasadena Ave., Cleveland)—an address never previously used in the case. Father received no notice of the subsequent proceedings. At the September 2025 support hearing, only mother and OCSS appeared; father was absent.
The magistrate found father’s employment status “unknown” but nonetheless imputed income to him at $62,970 annually—the average salary for a licensed plumber in Ohio—despite mother’s testimony that father was a plumbing apprentice. Father received no opportunity to present evidence regarding his actual employment. The magistrate ordered monthly child support of $670.89 plus $34.47 cash medical support plus a 2% processing fee, totaling $719.47 monthly.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. On the service-of-process issue, the court held that although OCSS’s unexplained change of address was troubling, father failed to challenge service at the trial-court level with evidence supporting his claim of non-receipt. Because father never filed a motion to vacate or objection challenging service, and because the certified-mail delivery complied with Civil Rule 4.1, proper service must be presumed. Father bore the burden to rebut this presumption with evidentiary-quality material presented to the trial court, which he did not do. Accordingly, the appellate court could not disturb the service determination.
However, the court found plain error in the income imputation. Under R.C. 3119.01(C)(10) and the controlling precedent of Ayers v. Ayers, a trial court must make two express determinations before imputing potential income: (1) that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or voluntarily underemployed, and (2) what the parent would have earned if fully employed, using statutory criteria. The trial court here skipped the first step, finding employment status “unknown” while simultaneously imputing income. This violated the “mandatory rather than discretionary obligation” to include an express determination of voluntary unemployment. The court could not treat the employment status as both unknown and voluntarily unemployed. The order’s silence or ambiguity on this required finding was improper; an assumption of voluntary unemployment from silence is not permitted under the statute.
Because the income imputation was erroneous, the parenting-time adjustment (a 10% support reduction under R.C. 3119.051(A) based on father’s 90+ overnight visitations annually) must also be recalculated, as it depends on the correctly determined income figure.
Key Takeaways
- Trial courts must make an express, clearly-evidenced determination of voluntary unemployment or underemployment before imputing potential income in child-support cases—assumption from silence is insufficient.
- Procedural defaults matter: Service-of-process defects must be challenged at the trial-court level with evidence; appellate courts cannot consider unsupported assertions in briefs and are bound by the presumption of proper service when civil rules are followed.
- Income imputation errors require recalculation of all support adjustments, including parenting-time reductions, because these adjustments are mathematically tied to the income determination.
- The statute requires courts to “literally and technically” follow support-calculation requirements in all material respects; discretion in child support does not excuse statutory compliance.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that even when a trial court uses an approved service method and delivery is technically accomplished, substantive due-process concerns about the reasonableness of the address chosen may exist—but such concerns must be raised and contested in the trial court, not for the first time on appeal. The ruling creates an incentive for parties to challenge dubious addresses immediately.
More significantly, the court’s reversal on income imputation is a clear warning to trial courts that the statutory framework for calculating child support is not discretionary. The decision aligns with recent Ohio Supreme Court precedent (Ayers) requiring explicit findings of voluntary unemployment before imputing income. Courts cannot shortcut the process or rely on silence. This protects obligors from arbitrary income assignments and ensures that support orders rest on a properly developed factual and legal foundation. The case underscores that technical compliance with statutory child-support procedures is mandatory, not merely preferred practice.