Background
In May 2022, Justice Colvin made vexatious proceedings orders against Celestine Ogbonna under s 37AO of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). Those orders prohibited Mr Ogbonna from instituting proceedings in the Federal Court against CTI Logistics Limited, certain of its officers and employees, and five specified individuals, or any of their legal representatives.
Mr Ogbonna sought leave to institute proceedings notwithstanding the vexatious order. He proposed to bring defamation and malicious prosecution claims arising from bankruptcy proceedings that CTI Logistics had instituted against him. His application was supported by affidavits filed in September 2025 and February 2026, accompanied by a proposed statement of claim. The affidavits listed Mr Ogbonna’s extensive litigation history dating back to 2013, including numerous unsuccessful defamation claims and appeals.
The Court’s Holding
Justice Colvin dismissed the application for leave. The court first addressed Mr Ogbonna’s request for the judge to recuse himself, holding that previous adverse decisions alone do not establish reasonable apprehension of bias under Re JRL; ex parte CJL. The court noted that consistency in reaching adverse outcomes does not demonstrate judicial prejudice or lack of impartiality.
The court found the application failed to substantially comply with s 37AR(3), which requires disclosure of all relevant facts supporting or adversing the application. The proposed statement of claim was vague, extremely repetitive, and lacked coherence or any comprehensible narrative. Critically, Mr Ogbonna failed to address how absolute privilege—which attaches to statements made in court documents and judicial proceedings under Mann v O’Neill—would not defeat his defamation claims, since his complaints centred on materials presented during the bankruptcy proceedings.
Under s 37AS(2), the court must dismiss if it considers the proceedings vexatious. The court found the proposed proceedings manifestly vexatious. Mr Ogbonna’s litigation history since 2013 showed him to be a prolific litigant with numerous unsuccessful defamation claims and appeals. The incoherent form of the proposed statement of claim rendered it so obviously untenable that commencing proceedings in that form would constitute an abuse of process.
Key Takeaways
- Applicants seeking leave to institute vexatious proceedings must substantially comply with s 37AR requirements, including clear disclosure of factual foundations for proposed claims.
- A judge’s previous adverse decisions against a litigant do not establish reasonable apprehension of bias; consistency in outcomes does not indicate prejudice or lack of impartiality.
- Defamation claims based on statements in court documents and judicial proceedings face absolute privilege defence, which must be addressed by applicants seeking leave.
- Courts will scrutinise applications from prolific litigants with histories of unsuccessful litigation to determine whether proposed proceedings are manifestly groundless or obviously untenable.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the strict procedural and substantive barriers to leave for vexatious litigants. It demonstrates that courts will dismiss applications that fail basic drafting and disclosure requirements and that lack coherent legal foundation. For litigants seeking to challenge vexatious orders, the decision underscores the necessity of proper pleading, identification of defensive privileges, and disclosure of factual detail. The decision also clarifies that judicial impartiality cannot be impugned merely by pointing to previous adverse outcomes, protecting judges from recusal requests based on consistency in judgment.