Background
On July 10, 2018, Atlanta Police Officer Jon Grubbs chased Jerry Blasingame, a 65-year-old homeless man suspected of panhandling on a roadside near Interstate 20. When Blasingame crossed a guardrail and fled toward a steep embankment with a 30-to-40-degree slope and approximately 30-foot drop, Officer Grubbs deployed his taser in dart mode without warning. The taser struck Blasingame in the back, causing him to fall down the embankment and strike a concrete utility box platform below. Blasingame suffered traumatic brain injury and spinal cord damage, rendering him quadriplegic.
Keith Edwards, Blasingame’s guardian and conservator, sued Officer Grubbs and the City of Atlanta under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force. The jury verdict, returned in August 2022 after an eight-day trial, awarded $100 million in damages: $60 million against the City and $40 million against Officer Grubbs (including $20 million in punitive damages). The district court denied Officer Grubbs’ qualified immunity defense but granted the City’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, overturning the jury verdict against the municipality. The court also reduced punitive damages to $1 million.
Officer Grubbs appealed the denial of qualified immunity. Edwards appealed the dismissal of the City’s liability and the reduction of punitive damages. The Eleventh Circuit consolidated these appeals.
The Court’s Holding
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity and upheld Officer Grubbs’ liability for excessive force. Applying the six-factor Graham v. Connor framework, the court found that the taser deployment violated Blasingame’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. The factors weighed heavily against the officer: Blasingame had committed only a misdemeanor, posed no threat to the officers or the public, was unarmed and non-violent, had fled but not been given a chance to comply before force was used, and suffered severe injuries (crushed skull and permanent quadriplegia) from the force applied.
Critically, the court held that deploying a taser against a person in a vulnerable elevated position—such as atop an eight-foot wall or, here, on a steep embankment above a highway—constitutes deadly force. The taser’s electrical impulse “instantly overrides the victim’s central nervous system, paralyzing the muscles throughout the body, rendering the target limp and helpless.” When deployed in such circumstances, a taser cannot be distinguished from a firearm in terms of its capacity to cause death or serious bodily harm. Officer Grubbs used this deadly force against an unarmed suspect fleeing a misdemeanor offense, without warning, in a location where loss of muscle control would result in a dangerous fall.
On the “clearly established law” prong, the court found that Tennessee v. Garner (prohibiting deadly force against non-dangerous fleeing suspects not suspected of violent crimes) was a materially similar precedent that put Officer Grubbs on notice. The court also cited its prior decision in Bradley v. Benton (2021), which held that tasing a non-dangerous unarmed suspect on an elevated surface violated clearly established law. The factual analogy was clear: an officer cannot use deadly force—whether a firearm or a taser in elevated circumstances—to stop an unarmed man not suspected of violent crime from fleeing on foot.
Key Takeaways
- Taser deployment against a suspect in an elevated or vulnerable position (steep terrain, height) that creates substantial risk of serious bodily harm or death constitutes deadly force subject to the heightened restrictions of Tennessee v. Garner.
- Deadly force may not be used to apprehend an unarmed suspect fleeing a minor misdemeanor offense without probable cause to believe the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm and without (where feasible) warning the suspect of the imminent use of force.
- An officer’s failure to provide verbal warning before deploying a taser, combined with the suspect’s vulnerable position and lack of threat, weighs strongly against the officer in excessive-force analysis.
- Qualified immunity may be raised for the first time at trial (assuming properly pled in the answer), even if not raised in a pre-trial motion, and the court reviews denial of qualified immunity de novo in light most favorable to the prevailing party.
- The proportionality factor in Graham analysis—relationship between the force needed and the force applied—is critical when an officer uses deadly force to stop an unarmed, non-dangerous fleeing suspect.
Why It Matters
This decision significantly expands police liability for taser use and clarifies that a taser is not categorically non-lethal. Courts must evaluate the context in which a taser is deployed; when used against a suspect in a vulnerable position where loss of muscular control creates a substantial risk of death or serious injury, the taser is deadly force subject to Garner’s strict requirements. This ruling binds all federal courts within the Eleventh Circuit (Alabama, Florida, Georgia) and provides persuasive authority nationwide for evaluating taser liability.
The opinion also reinforces that qualified immunity does not shield officers who use force in circumstances clearly established as unconstitutional by prior case law. The combination of Garner’s 1985 prohibition on deadly force against non-dangerous fleeing suspects and the circuit’s own 2021 Bradley decision made it clearly established in 2018 that the taser deployment here was unconstitutional. Officers in the circuit have clear notice that tasers deployed on elevated terrain or in circumstances creating a substantial risk of serious bodily harm will be treated as deadly force, and deadly force is permissible only in narrow circumstances—none of which were present here. The decision thus represents a significant loss for qualified immunity in the excessive-force context and a meaningful expansion of police accountability.