Background
Misty Bernat appealed a trial court order denying her petition to modify time-sharing and child support against Luis A. Mendez. The trial court adopted a general magistrate’s recommendation rejecting Bernat’s petition. Bernat argued the trial court misinterpreted and misapplied section 61.30(11)(c), Florida Statutes, which governs when courts may modify time-sharing and child support agreements based on a substantial change in circumstances.
The Court’s Holding
The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of Bernat’s petition. The appellate court found that Bernat failed to provide an adequate record for review, as she did not submit transcripts or evidence from the hearings before the general magistrate or trial court that led to the final order. Without these materials, the court could not assess whether the trial court committed reversible error.
The court noted that even without the full record, no error appeared on the face of the trial court’s order. The trial court properly interpreted section 61.30(11)(c) by finding that Mendez regularly exercised substantial time-sharing—well above the 20 percent overnight threshold—and therefore no substantial change in circumstances existed to warrant modification of the arrangement. Bernat’s argument that the trial court required Mendez to “fully abandon” the child mischaracterized the actual basis for the decision.
Key Takeaways
- Appellants seeking to challenge family law orders must provide complete transcripts and evidence from relevant proceedings; failure to do so prevents appellate review.
- Under Florida law, a parent must spend less than 20 percent of time-sharing with a child to meet the threshold for finding a substantial change in circumstances in modification cases.
- Trial courts have discretion in interpreting statutory modification standards, and appellate courts presume correctness absent clear reversible error.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the procedural requirements for appellate review in family law matters and clarifies the threshold for establishing a substantial change in circumstances under Florida’s time-sharing statutes. For practitioners, it underscores the critical importance of creating a complete appellate record—missing transcripts can be fatal to an appeal, regardless of the merits of underlying arguments.
The opinion also provides guidance on the statutory interpretation of section 61.30(11)(c), confirming that courts properly consider whether a parent maintains time-sharing above the 20 percent benchmark as a factor in rejecting modification petitions, not merely whether the parent has completely abandoned the child.