Adan v. Adan — Affirmed liability for stealing brother’s bank statements under Texas Theft Liability Act; upheld $440,000 attorney fee award.

Case
Yusuf A. Adan v. Mohamed A. Adan
Court
Texas Court of Appeals, Seventh District
Date Decided
June 26, 2026
Docket No.
07-25-00056-CV
Topics
Theft Liability; Intangible Property; Attorney’s Fees; Financial Records
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Yusuf and Mohamed Adan are brothers who co-founded Blue Bird Aviation in Kenya in 1992. In 2015, Yusuf initiated windup proceedings in Kenya, later bringing a derivative action on behalf of the company. A Kenyan court ordered shareholders, including Mohamed, to produce financial information in 2016, but that order was stayed on appeal.

Despite the stay, evidence showed Yusuf directed his Kenyan counsel to obtain copies of Mohamed’s personal bank statements from Wells Fargo and Emirates NBD Bank, including statements covering Mohamed, his wife, and children. These documents were obtained through an investigator and filed in the Kenyan proceedings. Mohamed subsequently sued Yusuf in Tarrant County under the Texas Theft Liability Act (TTLA), alleging conversion, and asserting claims for public disclosure of private facts and computer access violations. The jury found liability under the TTLA and for conversion.

The trial court awarded Mohamed $25,850 in compensatory damages and nearly $440,000 in attorney’s fees and $11,696.82 in court costs. Yusuf appealed, challenging whether financial records constitute property under the TTLA, whether evidence supported the theft finding, and whether the attorney’s fee award was proper.

The Court’s Holding

The court affirmed all judgments. On the threshold question whether financial records constitute “property” under the TTLA, the court held they do. Although Yusuf argued the records lacked readily ascertainable market value under the Penal Code definition, the trial court gave no limiting definition and Yusuf failed to object. Measuring sufficiency against the commonly understood meaning of property, the court found that account numbers, balances, transactions, assets, and credit history information constitute intangible property of value—similar to stock certificates or trade secrets, where the worth lies in the data, not the physical medium.

On the theft elements, the court rejected Yusuf’s argument that the jury instruction required evidence of “unlawful” conduct or conduct that deprived Mohamed of his records. The charge submitted to the jury—requiring only that Yusuf “acquire” or “exercise control over” property without the owner’s consent—was unobjected to. Evidence that Yusuf obtained copies of Mohamed’s financial records without consent, particularly after Mohamed obtained a stay of the production order, satisfied that standard. The court also overruled Yusuf’s challenge to the lack of a definition of “intent to appropriate” because he failed to tender a written definition at trial.

On damages, the court held the $25,850 award was supported by expenses Mohamed incurred as a natural, probable result of the theft: forensic IT investigation ($10,223.81), legal investigation into how records were obtained ($5,195), and Kenya-based counsel’s travel expenses. The damages instruction allowed recovery for “monetary loss and expense incurred,” and the jury’s award fell within that framework. The court also upheld the substantial attorney’s fee award, finding Mohamed adequately segregated recoverable TTLA fees from non-recoverable claims by identifying hours spent exclusively on non-recoverable claims and opining that remaining work advanced both types of claims simultaneously. The court rejected an argument that fees must be proportionate to damages recovered, holding that disproportionality is one factor among many and not dispositive when other Arthur Andersen factors—here, six years of litigation, complexity, multiple investigations, and contemporaneous billing records—support reasonableness.

Key Takeaways

  • Financial records containing confidential banking information qualify as “property” for TTLA purposes, even without readily ascertainable market value. The focus is intangible property value, not the physical document’s worth.
  • TTLA theft liability requires only non-consensual appropriation or control of property; the statute does not require proof that the taking was illegal under separate law or that the owner was deprived of use or access.
  • TTLA damages can include investigative and legal expenses incurred as a natural, probable result of the theft, not merely the intrinsic value of the property taken.
  • Substantial attorney’s fees can be recovered under the TTLA even when they substantially exceed compensatory damages, provided the trial court applies the lodestar method and considers all relevant Arthur Andersen factors.
  • Segregation of attorney’s fees between recoverable and non-recoverable claims can be satisfied by identifying hours spent exclusively on non-recoverable work and providing expert opinion that remaining work advanced both recoverable and non-recoverable claims simultaneously.

Why It Matters

This decision significantly expands TTLA protection to intangible property, particularly confidential financial information. Practitioners representing those whose banking records or other financial information is misappropriated now have a clearer basis for pursuing TTLA remedies. The ruling that damages include investigative and legal expenses incurred in response to the theft is particularly valuable, as it allows recovery beyond the nominal value of the records themselves. This effectively enables plaintiffs to recover the full cost of addressing a confidential-information breach.

The fee-award analysis also has broad implications. Courts may now award substantial attorney’s fees under the TTLA in cases involving complex, multi-year investigations into how confidential information was obtained, even where the eventual damages award is modest. The decision clarifies that the ratio of fees to damages is not the controlling consideration and affirms that comprehensive segregation of fees—using percentage allocations supported by attorney testimony where work overlaps—satisfies the Chapa standard.

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