Background
Megan Scott and Jonathan Bruner (Decedent) were a couple who shared a pet Goldendoodle named Evie. Decedent died intestate on May 5, 2022; his father, Gary Bruner, was named personal representative of the estate. Gary Bruner had never lived with or met Evie before his son’s death, but he demanded that Scott surrender the dog. When Scott refused, Bruner filed an action for claim and delivery in Charleston County magistrate’s court, seeking possession of Evie.
At the magistrate hearing, Scott sought to introduce a veterinary intake form (the Form) completed by Decedent when Evie was first presented to a veterinary practice. The practice manager testified the Form is used in the ordinary course of business for all new patients. On the Form, Decedent had handwritten “Megan Scott” in the space labeled “Co-owner Name.” In a separate field asking who is “authorized to make medical decisions for your pets,” Decedent wrote “Owners” (plural). The magistrate excluded the Form as inadmissible hearsay and found Scott had presented no evidence of co-ownership. The circuit court affirmed, relying in part on Bruner’s representation at a virtual hearing that the form was a “pre-populated” document in which no co-owner selection was available.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals (Thomas, McDonald, and Turner, JJ.) reversed on both issues. First, the court held the Form was admissible under the business-records exception, Rule 803(6), SCRE. The practice manager’s testimony established that the Form was (1) made at or near the time of the event recorded; (2) prepared from information transmitted by a person with knowledge; (3) made and kept in the course of regularly conducted business; and (4) identified by a qualified witness. Nothing in the record suggested the Form was untrustworthy. Accordingly, the magistrate and circuit court abused their discretion in excluding it.
Second, Decedent’s two specific statements on the Form—writing “Megan Scott” in the Co-owner Name field and writing “Owners” (plural) in the authorized-medical-decisions field—were separately admissible as statements against interest under Rule 804(b)(3), SCRE. Decedent was unavailable as a declarant (having died), and each statement was against his proprietary interest because acknowledging Scott as co-owner diminished his exclusive ownership of the dog. A reasonable person in Decedent’s position would not have made those statements unless believing them to be true.
The court also found the circuit court’s affirmance rested on a factual error induced by misrepresentation. At the Webex hearing, Bruner’s counsel argued the Form was “pre-populated” with no option for the declarant to select a co-owner. The face of the Form contradicted that: it contained a blank “Co-owner Name” field and a separate blank for authorized individuals—Decedent handwrote “Megan Scott” in the former and “Owners” in the latter. The magistrate’s finding that the Form reflected only “authorization” was unsupported by the evidence; the circuit court’s acceptance of that finding was an abuse of discretion. The reversal returned the case to the lower courts with the Form’s contents properly before them as compelling evidence of co-ownership.
Key Takeaways
- A veterinary intake form completed by a deceased owner in the ordinary course of veterinary business qualifies for the business-records hearsay exception under Rule 803(6), SCRE, when the practice manager testifies to the practice’s standard procedure for collecting information from all new patients.
- A deceased declarant’s written statement on a document acknowledging another person as co-owner of personal property is admissible as a statement against the declarant’s proprietary interest under Rule 804(b)(3), SCRE, because it diminishes the declarant’s exclusive ownership claim.
- The practical distinction between a “Co-owner Name” field and an “Authorized Individuals” field on a veterinary form is legally significant: completing the former is evidence of co-ownership, not merely authorization to act on the owner’s behalf, and a factual finding to the contrary is an abuse of discretion where the face of the document contradicts it.
- Misrepresentation of the contents of documentary evidence to an appellate or trial court can lead to reversal when the actual document contradicts the representation, particularly in virtual hearings where the original may not be examined in real time.
Why It Matters
Pet custody disputes are an increasing fact of life in South Carolina courts, particularly in the aftermath of a partner’s death or a separation. Scott v. Estate of Bruner is a practical reminder that the hearsay rules are not necessarily an obstacle when the decedent has left contemporaneous written evidence of the couple’s intent. Practitioners representing surviving partners in pet-ownership disputes should look for business records—veterinary records, pet insurance policies, microchip registrations, or licensing records—completed by the decedent that identify the survivor as a co-owner or joint caretaker. Under the court’s analysis, such records can supply admissible evidence of co-ownership even when the declarant cannot testify.
The case also illustrates the importance of accurately representing the contents of documentary evidence, particularly in virtual proceedings where the judge may not have the original in hand. The court’s observation that Bruner’s characterization of the Form as “pre-populated” was simply wrong—and that the circuit court accepted that characterization—underscores the risk of misrepresentation in an environment where real-time document review is impractical.