Background
Benjamin Griffin (Father) and Lesa Benjamin (Mother) had their custody and child support arrangement originally ordered by a California family court. By the time Father filed his complaint for modification in York County, South Carolina, no party lived in California: Father was an Air Force servicemember living in North Carolina, Mother had relocated to South Carolina, and their child V.G. had been living with Mother in South Carolina before beginning extended visitation with Father in North Carolina. V.G. eventually chose to remain with Father indefinitely.
Father sought modification of the California custody order and termination of his child support obligation to Mother. The South Carolina family court found it had jurisdiction over both requests, terminated Father’s child support obligation, and denied Mother’s motions to dismiss, for a custody change, and for sanctions. Mother appealed, arguing: (1) South Carolina lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the California order; (2) the family court had no authority to terminate child support before V.G. turned eighteen; (3) the motion to dismiss should have been granted; and (4) she was entitled to sanctions and attorney’s fees.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals (Konduros, Geathers, and Vinson, JJ.) affirmed on all grounds. The opinion navigates an unusually layered set of jurisdictional requirements under two parallel interstate compacts: the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), S.C. Code Ann. §§ 63‑15‑300 to ‑394 (2010), which governs custody; and the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), S.C. Code Ann. §§ 63‑17‑2900 to ‑4040 (2010 & Supp. 2025), which governs child support. The two statutes operate independently and carry distinct jurisdictional requirements.
Under the UCCJEA, a South Carolina court may modify another state’s custody order if (a) South Carolina has jurisdiction to make an initial determination and (b) the issuing state no longer has jurisdiction. South Carolina was V.G.’s home state or had been her home state within six months of the filing date (§ 63‑15‑330(A)(1)), and none of the parties continued to reside in California—ending California’s continuing exclusive jurisdiction under both the UCCJEA and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A. The court performed its own de novo factual review, confirmed the residential facts from the pleadings and orders, and found jurisdiction established.
Under the UIFSA, a South Carolina tribunal may modify a registered foreign support order if none of the obligor, the obligee, or the child resides in the issuing state, and the petitioner is a nonresident seeking modification of a South Carolina-registered order with the respondent subject to personal jurisdiction here. § 63‑17‑3830(A). All three conditions were met. Critically, the UIFSA provides that South Carolina “may not modify any aspect of a child-support order that may not be modified under the law of the issuing state, including the duration of the obligation.” § 63‑17‑3830(C). The court therefore applied California law to the duration question.
Under California authority, a parent’s child support obligation is owed to the child, not to the custodial parent. A parent may discharge a court-ordered support obligation by directly providing support when the child lives in that parent’s home with the other parent’s consent or acquiescence, in an amount equal to or exceeding the court-ordered obligation. See Jackson v. Jackson, 124 Cal. Rptr. 101 (Ct. App. 1975); In re Marriage of Trainotti, 261 Cal. Rptr. 36 (Ct. App. 1989). Because V.G. voluntarily left Mother’s home to live with Father, and Father was directly providing V.G.’s support, the California obligation was properly terminated under California law as incorporated by the UIFSA.
On the remaining issues: the motion to dismiss became moot when V.G. turned nineteen before trial, extinguishing any live controversy about emancipation procedure. Mother’s sanctions argument was abandoned because her brief cited no legal authority other than the appellate standard of review—conclusory arguments without supporting authority are considered abandoned on appeal. Attorney’s fees were denied because both parties achieved some beneficial results, Mother had demonstrated the ability to pay her own fees, and her own litigation conduct prolonged the case despite V.G.’s consistent preference to remain with Father.
Key Takeaways
- A South Carolina family court has subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to modify a custody order issued by another state when no party currently resides in the issuing state, even if the issuing state’s court originally retained continuing exclusive jurisdiction; once no party resides there, that jurisdiction dissolves by operation of both the UCCJEA and the PKPA.
- A South Carolina family court has UIFSA jurisdiction to modify a registered foreign support order when none of the obligor, obligee, or child resides in the issuing state, the petitioner is a nonresident of South Carolina, and the respondent is subject to personal jurisdiction in South Carolina; § 63‑17‑3830(A).
- Because the UIFSA provides that the law of the issuing state governs the “duration” of the support obligation (§ 63‑17‑3830(C)–(D)), practitioners modifying foreign support orders must analyze whether the issuing state’s law permits the proposed modification—California’s rule that a parent directly supporting a child in their home discharges the court-ordered obligation is a significant departure from how South Carolina would otherwise approach this question.
- Child support obligations are owed to the child, not to the custodial parent; when a child voluntarily leaves the obligee-parent’s home and lives with the obligor-parent, the obligor’s direct provision of support may discharge the court-ordered obligation under the applicable state’s law.
- A brief that cites no authority relevant to an argument—even if the argument is recited at length factually—is treated as abandoned on appeal; this rule applies in family court appeals just as in other civil proceedings.
Why It Matters
South Carolina’s military population and high rate of interstate family relocation make UCCJEA and UIFSA jurisdiction questions a recurring issue in family court. Griffin v. Benjamin provides a rare example of the appellate court working through both interstate statutes in tandem in the same proceeding—a fact pattern that will be familiar to family law practitioners who handle custody and support modifications when the original order came from a state where the family no longer lives. The opinion’s holding that South Carolina may apply the issuing state’s law to “duration” of support, and that California’s direct-support-discharge doctrine governs when V.G. moved to Father’s home, is an important reminder that the law of the issuing state is not just relevant to enforcement but can also inform the scope of any permitted modification.
Practitioners should also note the court’s pointed abandonment ruling: the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act (§§ 15‑36‑10 to ‑100) was invoked by Mother as a basis for sanctions, but the argument was forfeited for failure to cite the statute or any case law in the opening brief. An argument raised in the reply brief for the first time is too late and cannot cure the omission from the opening brief.