Background
Indiana’s judicial selection system varies by county. Most Indiana judges are elected, but three populous counties—Lake, Marion, and St. Joseph—use the “Missouri Plan,” where the governor appoints judges from a list vetted by a nonpartisan commission, and voters then decide only whether to retain them. Lake County, encompassing Gary and Hammond with over 500,000 residents, adopted this system in 1973 following a comprehensive study showing that partisan elections were causing court dysfunction, case backlogs, and unequal judicial workloads.
The City of Hammond and three voters sued in 2021, claiming Indiana’s use of the Missouri Plan for Lake County superior-court judges violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. They noted that Lake County’s voting-age population is over 40% racial minorities, while the rest of Indiana is less than 20% nonwhite. They argued that retention-only ballots gave minority voters “less opportunity” than white voters in other counties to elect judges “of their choice,” and sought an injunction requiring open, contested elections instead.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, relying on the Seventh Circuit’s 1988 precedent in Quinn v. Illinois, which held that Section 2 does not guarantee that any public office be filled by election rather than appointment. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing Quinn should be distinguished or overruled.
The Court’s Holding
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court avoided resolving the tension between Quinn and its earlier precedent in Bradley v. Work by applying the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Louisiana v. Callais (2026). Callais held that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act “imposes liability only when the circumstances give rise to a strong inference that intentional discrimination occurred”—not merely disparate impact.
Applying Callais, the court found no evidence that Indiana’s 1973 decision to adopt the Missouri Plan was motivated by racial discrimination. The state legislature adopted the system within months of receiving a study from the Institute for Court Management recommending merit-based selection to address “pervasive dissatisfaction” with Lake County’s courts caused by partisan elections. The Institute’s recommendations had nothing to do with race; they focused on court administration, case management, and reducing electoral pressures on judges.
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to infer racial motivation from a 2005 statement by the Indiana Secretary of State’s general counsel describing the merit system as essential for a “highly diverse jurisdiction.” The counsel did not join the office until 2005—32 years after the legislature’s 1973 enactment—so his later views shed no light on the legislature’s actual motivations in 1973. The court found no strong inference of intentional racial discrimination and therefore affirmed dismissal.
Key Takeaways
- Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act now requires proof of intentional racial discrimination, not merely disparate impact, following Louisiana v. Callais.
- Merit-based judicial selection systems remain compatible with the Voting Rights Act even where they have racially disparate effects, provided they were not adopted with a discriminatory purpose.
- Demographic disparities alone—such as minorities comprising 40% of one county’s voting-age population but having only retention ballots—cannot establish a Section 2 violation without evidence of intentional discrimination.
- A judicially sound motivation for adopting a judicial selection system (eliminating partisan election pressures and court dysfunction) defeats Section 2 liability regardless of its incidental racial effects.
Why It Matters
This decision significantly narrows Section 2 challenges to judicial selection and other structural voting arrangements. By requiring a “strong inference” of intentional discrimination rather than accepting disparate-impact evidence, Callais has reshaped VRA litigation across the country. States and municipalities can now implement merit-based systems, appointment schemes, or other non-electoral governance structures without fear of automatic Section 2 liability based on demographic comparisons alone. This shifts the burden substantially toward plaintiffs, who must now produce direct evidence or circumstantial evidence creating a strong inference of racial animus in legislative decision-making.
For judicial selection specifically, the ruling validates the Missouri Plan and similar merit systems adopted in numerous states and counties. It removes a potential legal vulnerability for jurisdictions seeking to reduce partisan influence or improve court administration through appointment mechanisms, even in diverse areas. The decision reflects the Supreme Court’s broader trajectory limiting the reach of Section 2 to intentional discrimination claims, a significant retreat from the disparate-impact doctrine that dominated VRA litigation for decades.