Background
On August 29, 2019, police stopped a vehicle driven by Terrell Henry Fields, then 20 years old, and discovered a loaded .40 caliber handgun in the vehicle. Fields did not possess a permit to carry the handgun. A grand jury indicted him on six counts, including possession and transportation of a firearm in connection with alleged drug trafficking, transportation of a loaded handgun in a vehicle, and possession of a regulated firearm while under age 21. The State ultimately nolle prossed the drug-related charges and proceeded only on the three firearms violations.
On June 24, 2022—one day after the Supreme Court decided New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen—Fields moved to dismiss, arguing that Bruen invalidated Maryland’s firearm permitting scheme that required applicants to demonstrate “good and substantial reason” to carry a handgun. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, characterizing Bruen as “fairly Draconian and myopic” and dismissing all charges. The State appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Appellate Court reversed and held that the circuit court erred in dismissing the charges. Applying Bruen’s two-part framework, the court first assumed without deciding whether individuals under 21 are part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. On the second prong, the court held that Maryland’s age-based prohibition on firearm possession by those under 21 is constitutional as applied to individuals aged 18–20 because it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court found that historical evidence supports age-based restrictions on firearm access.
Regarding the handgun transportation charges under CR § 4-203, the court acknowledged that Bruen invalidated the “good and substantial reason” requirement of the permitting scheme in effect at the time of Fields’s arrest. However, the court applied severability doctrine and held that the unconstitutional requirement could be severed from the rest of the permitting framework, leaving a constitutional scheme. Because Fields failed to demonstrate that the permitting statute—with the offending language removed—was unconstitutional, the court erred in dismissing these counts.
Key Takeaways
- Age-based restrictions on firearm possession for those 18–20 years old survive Second Amendment challenge when justified by historical tradition of firearm regulation.
- Bruen’s invalidation of “may issue” permitting schemes requiring “good and substantial reason” does not invalidate all firearm permitting requirements; a “shall issue” scheme remains constitutional.
- Unconstitutional provisions of otherwise constitutional statutes may be severed, preserving the remainder of the legislative scheme.
- A defendant challenging a permitting scheme must establish unconstitutionality; the burden is not on the State to prove the applicant attempted to obtain a permit or that such attempt would have been futile.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies the scope of Bruen’s holding post-Heller. While Bruen struck down “may issue” permitting regimes requiring individualized showings of special need, it did not invalidate age-based firearm restrictions or permitting itself. The court’s application of severability doctrine signals that legislatures need not entirely repeal statutes containing one unconstitutional provision; they may surgically remove the offending language while preserving constitutional restrictions. This has significant implications for firearms regulation nationwide, as many states maintain age restrictions on firearm possession that may now withstand constitutional challenge under the historical-tradition test.
The decision also matters for its treatment of facial versus as-applied challenges in the Second Amendment context. The court limited Fields’s challenge to individuals aged 18–20 rather than all persons under 21, requiring appellants to stay within the scope of arguments presented at trial and avoiding broad pronouncements on age classifications not yet briefed.