Background
The claimant’s personal data was compromised in a data leak relating to Afghanistan operations. In response, the Secretary of State for Defence implemented the Afghanistan Response Route (ARR Policy, Version 3.0), intended to provide relocation for those at “highest risk” due to the data leak. The policy identifies candidates by reference to “high-profile roles” listed in Addenda A and B. A third category covers individuals who held “a different high-profile role” where it has been determined they held a role putting them at “equivalent risk” to Addenda A or B roles.
The claimant did not fall within Addenda A or B and was considered under this third category. The claimant worked for an organization in Afghanistan regarded as a direct enemy of the Taliban and had been subject to adverse Taliban activity. However, on 5 June 2025, the Secretary of State refused relocation, concluding the claimant did not meet the threshold because neither the claimant nor the employer were “directly involved in action to prevent Taliban activity.”
Special Advocates challenged this decision on four grounds, arguing the Defendant had misdirected itself on the legal test, failed to recognize material evidence, and reached an irrational conclusion.
The Court’s Holding
Mr Justice Saini dismissed all four grounds of challenge. On the first ground, the court held there was no misdirection in law. The ARR Policy directs decision-makers to apply the Guidance when determining whether the “equivalent risk” condition is satisfied. The Guidance lawfully requires consideration of whether the individual took action to “prevent Taliban activity.” The court found it was not a misdirection to adopt this as a determinant of equivalent risk; doing so simply applies the Defendant’s own lawfully adopted Guidance and would not render the Guidance meaningless.
On the second and third grounds, the court rejected the argument that organizational opposition to the Taliban was equivalent to individual direct action to prevent Taliban activity, and that the claimant’s role in the organization was equivalent to Addenda A roles. The court found no logical flaw in distinguishing between working for an anti-Taliban organization and personally taking direct action to prevent Taliban activity. On the fourth ground, the court found the Defendant was rationally entitled to conclude that the claimant’s work as a Logistics Manager in a training and professional organization promoting the rule of law was insufficient to meet the “direct action” requirement, particularly given the policy’s intention to protect only those involved in direct action against the Taliban, as opposed to those promoting general civil society objectives.
Key Takeaways
- The ARR Policy’s Guidance requirement for “direct action to prevent Taliban activity” is a lawful application of the “equivalent risk” test and is not a misdirection when applied by the decision-maker.
- Working for or supporting an organization opposed to the Taliban is legally and factually distinguishable from the individual taking direct action to prevent Taliban activity.
- Judicial review of national security decisions applies “anxious scrutiny” but respects rational applications of policy discretion by the executive, even where distinctions are fine-grained.
- The ARR Policy is intended to be strictly applied to a carefully targeted cohort of high-risk individuals, not to create a wide route of entry.
Why It Matters
This judgment significantly clarifies the scope of the ARR Policy, a critical relocation mechanism for individuals affected by the Afghanistan data leak. By establishing that “equivalent risk” requires direct action to prevent Taliban activity—not merely organizational opposition to the Taliban—the court has narrowed the class of Afghan nationals and international workers eligible for relocation protection. This distinction has substantial real-world consequences for vulnerable individuals seeking safety.
The judgment also illustrates the courts’ calibrated approach to judicial review of national security policy: combining “anxious scrutiny” of decision-making with appropriate deference to executive judgment on risk assessment and policy implementation. While courts will closely examine reasoning in cases involving high stakes, they will not second-guess rational policy choices even when the underlying distinctions appear contestable.