Background
Sunee Lynn Mitchell accepted a negotiated plea bargain in Mendocino County, pleading no contest to a single felony count of driving with willful or wanton disregard for safety while fleeing from an officer. In exchange, the more serious assault charges—including strike offenses that carried significantly longer sentences—were dismissed. Mitchell stipulated to an upper term sentence of three years on the felony, doubled to six years under the Three Strikes law because of a prior robbery conviction.
While Mitchell’s case was still on appeal, Senate Bill 567 took effect on January 1, 2022. The new law amended Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b), to require that any facts used to justify an upper term sentence be either stipulated to by the defendant or proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. The amendment effectively made the middle term the presumptive maximum sentence absent those additional findings—a major shift from the prior regime, which gave trial courts broad discretion to pick any term in the sentencing triad.
Mitchell argued on appeal that the new law applied retroactively to her nonfinal case and that her upper term sentence should be reduced to the middle term. The Court of Appeal disagreed, reasoning that section 1170(b) did not apply to stipulated plea sentences because the trial court never exercised discretion in selecting Mitchell’s term. The California Supreme Court granted review to resolve a split of authority among the appellate courts.
The Court’s Holding
The California Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Court of Appeal. Writing for a 7-0 court, Justice Corrigan held that SB 567’s amendments to section 1170(b) apply retroactively to defendants who agreed to upper term sentences as part of a plea bargain and whose cases were not yet final when the law took effect.
The court rejected the Attorney General’s argument that section 1170(b) simply does not apply to negotiated sentences. Citing its 2024 decision in People v. Lynch, the court explained that section 1170(b) governs all sentences imposed pursuant to a sentencing triad, including plea-bargained upper terms. The court also rejected an “implied waiver” theory, holding that Mitchell could not have waived rights that did not exist at the time she entered her plea. Section 1016.8—which bars plea terms that waive unknown future legislative benefits—reinforced this conclusion.
However, the court also rejected Mitchell’s request for an automatic reduction to the middle term. Following the framework from People v. Stamps (2020), the court held that the proper remedy is a remand giving Mitchell three options: (1) reaffirm the plea bargain by waiving section 1170(b)’s new requirements, in which case the original six-year sentence stands; (2) negotiate a modified plea agreement with a middle term sentence, subject to court approval; or (3) withdraw her plea entirely and return to a pre-plea posture, where she would face all original charges at trial.
Key Takeaways
- Defendants who accepted upper term sentences via plea bargain before SB 567 may invoke the new sentencing protections retroactively if their cases were not yet final.
- Agreeing to an upper term sentence as part of a plea deal does not constitute an implied waiver of later-enacted sentencing rights the defendant could not have known about.
- The remedy is not an automatic sentence reduction. Instead, the case is remanded so the defendant can choose to waive the new protections, renegotiate the plea, or withdraw the plea entirely.
- A plea bargain that includes an upper term sentence still requires the trial court to impose a sentence “authorized by law”—section 1170(b)’s requirements are not bypassed simply because the parties agreed to the term.
- The court disapproved People v. Sallee (2023) to the extent it held otherwise.
Why It Matters
This decision resolves a conflict that had been percolating through California’s appellate courts since SB 567 took effect. For criminal defense attorneys, it means that clients with nonfinal upper term plea sentences now have leverage to renegotiate—or potentially withdraw from—deals that were struck under the old sentencing framework. Prosecutors who relied on stipulated upper terms in plea agreements may need to reassess those dispositions in pending appeals.
For the broader criminal justice system, the practical impact may be modest: many defendants will likely choose to keep their existing bargains rather than risk trial exposure on more serious charges. But for some—particularly those whose plea deals included relatively small concessions from the prosecution—the ability to reopen negotiations could lead to significantly different outcomes. Trial courts should expect a wave of remand proceedings as this decision filters through the pipeline of nonfinal cases.