Background
Caroline Griffiths-Fowell, who has learning difficulties, mental health issues, and multiple disabilities, applied to Birmingham City Council for housing assistance in August 2022 for herself and her disabled brother, Ian Fowell, who is paralyzed and wheelchair-bound with multiple health conditions. The council accepted its duty to provide suitable accommodation in November 2022 but initially housed them in bed and breakfast accommodation. Over the following years, the council offered temporary accommodation at various properties—including a hotel, a flat at 22 Langdon Walk, and a maisonette at 7 Holden Close—repeatedly asserting each was suitable despite lacking adaptations for the brother’s disabilities.
When the claimant briefly left 7 Holden Close in August 2025 during a mental health crisis to stay in supported accommodation for a few nights, Birmingham City Council subsequently claimed in September 2025 that it had discharged its housing duty under section 193(6)(d) of the Housing Act 1996 because the claimant had “voluntarily ceased to occupy” the accommodation as her principal home. The claimant challenged this decision by judicial review.
The High Court granted a declaration in November 2025 that the council had breached its main housing duty from 2 July 2024. The court found the accommodation offered was unsuitable and rejected the council’s argument that the duty had ceased. Birmingham City Council appealed to the Court of Appeal.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal (Lord Justice Singh and Lord Justice Holgate) upheld the High Court’s declaration of breach. The court held that section 193(6)(d) of the Housing Act 1996—which provides the duty ceases when an applicant “voluntarily ceases to occupy as his only or principal home the accommodation made available”—only applies when the accommodation in question is suitable. Where accommodation is unsuitable, an applicant’s temporary absence does not trigger cessation of the duty.
The court found that 7 Holden Close was unsuitable: it lacked proper adaptations for the brother’s significant disabilities, with inaccessible bathroom facilities and an unsuitable stairlift. The claimant’s brief absence during a mental health emergency, with the intention of respite care rather than abandonment of the accommodation, did not constitute voluntary cessation of occupation as her principal home. The council remained bound by its duty to provide truly suitable accommodation.
On a procedural issue, the court confirmed that judicial review remains available to challenge suitability decisions under the Housing Act 1996 even though statutory review by the authority and appeal to the county court are also available. The declaration of breach remained valid and binding despite subsequent changes in the claimant’s circumstances (she later indicated she no longer sought joint accommodation with her brother), as the declaration itself was not rendered academic by such changes.
Key Takeaways
- Section 193(6)(d) of the Housing Act 1996 only allows cessation of the main housing duty if the applicant voluntarily ceases to occupy suitable accommodation; unsuitable accommodation does not trigger the provision.
- Temporary absence from unsuitable accommodation during personal crisis (such as mental health breakdown) does not constitute voluntary cessation of occupation as one’s principal home.
- Judicial review remains a viable remedy for challenging local housing authority decisions on suitability despite the existence of statutory review procedures and county court appeals under the Housing Act.
- A declaratory judgment of breach of housing duty remains binding and effective even when circumstances change such that specific mandatory relief becomes inapplicable.
Why It Matters
This decision significantly protects homeless persons with disabilities by establishing that local housing authorities cannot escape their statutory duty to provide suitable accommodation by offering unsuitable properties and then claiming the duty has ceased when applicants temporarily leave due to personal crisis. The judgment reinforces that suitability is a genuine requirement, not a box to be ticked; authorities must assess and address the specific disability needs of applicants and their household members. For vulnerable individuals dependent on adapted housing, the decision ensures that brief absences—particularly those arising from mental health emergencies or medical crises—cannot be weaponized to discharge the authority’s continuing duty.
The case also has significance for judicial review practice in housing law, confirming that the existence of statutory review mechanisms does not preclude resort to the supervisory jurisdiction where justice requires it, particularly for applicants lacking resources or capacity to navigate multiple procedural layers. The upholding of the declaration despite changed circumstances demonstrates that courts will maintain clear statements of public law principle even when specific remedies become moot, preserving authoritative guidance for future cases involving similar vulnerable populations.