Background
Ms Sadaf Ijaz, a solicitor, was issued a written rebuke by the SRA Adjudicator following findings that she had breached Outcome 5.3 of the Solicitors’ Code of Conduct 2011. The breach involved deliberately failing to pay two court-ordered costs judgments in favour of her office landlord: one from 2019 (paid only in August 2022, two years late) and another from 2022 (paid in June 2023, despite an unsuccessful application to stay execution). The SRA Adjudication Panel upheld this decision on 9 February 2024.
Ms Ijaz appealed to the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, which dismissed her appeal on 22 October 2025. She then sought to appeal to the High Court’s Administrative Court on 12 November 2025, but filed her Appellant’s Notice without any grounds of appeal, stating grounds would follow “within the next 21 days.” No grounds were filed until 31 March 2026—over four months later—and only after the court’s direct intervention.
The Court’s Holding
Deputy Judge Alan Bates dismissed the appeal primarily on procedural grounds. He held that grounds of appeal constitute an essential requirement for bringing a valid appeal, and that an Appellant’s Notice filed without grounds cannot constitute a complete appeal, even if a court officer accepts and seals the notice. While the appeal was brought within the 21-day deadline under Civil Procedure Rules 52.12(2)(b), the subsequent failure to obtain permission before filing grounds four months later was fatal to the appeal. The Appellant had not applied for permission to rely on belatedly filed grounds, and the court would have refused such application absent “truly extraordinary circumstances,” given the four-month delay and prejudice to the respondent.
Applying principles from Siniakovich v Hassan-Soudey [2026] EWCA Civ 215 and Eskander v GMC [2026] EWCA Civ 372, the court clarified that while filing a document may be sufficient despite ancillary omissions (such as court fees), grounds of appeal are not ancillary but essential to the substance of an appeal. The court noted that without grounds, the respondent cannot understand the basis on which the decision is being challenged.
Even if the grounds had been admitted, the court found them meritless. On the core disciplinary issue, even assuming a minor factual error by the Adjudication Panel regarding whether Ms Ijaz had requested a stay of the 2019 costs order, that error was not material: she remained in deliberate breach by failing to pay for extended periods after her appeal was struck out. The SDT properly upheld the disciplinary sanction.
Key Takeaways
- Grounds of appeal are an essential (not ancillary) component of an appeal notice and must accompany or be filed with the Appellant’s Notice; counsel permission is required to file them belatedly.
- The principle of open justice ordinarily prevails in disciplinary proceedings; closure orders require a stronger justification than general concerns about third-party harassment.
- VAT paid by the SRA to legal service providers cannot be recovered as input tax where regulation is not a taxable supply; costs awards may therefore include VAT without accounting for unrecoverable VAT.
- Minor factual errors in a disciplinary panel’s reasoning do not vitiate the sanction if the core findings of breach are sound and materially support the discipline imposed.
Why It Matters
This judgment establishes an important procedural boundary: the filing of an appeal notice, standing alone, is not sufficient. Grounds of appeal are a substantive requirement, not a procedural formality that can be indefinitely delayed. The decision applies recent Court of Appeal authority (Siniakovich, Eskander) to clarify what constitutes a valid appeal, holding that certain elements—notably grounds—remain essential despite the general principle that courts should not dismiss appeals on technical grounds. For solicitors and legal practitioners subject to discipline, it confirms that procedural excellence is expected: the court expressed concern that a solicitor was unable to manage her own proceedings competently, with “very late applications” and repeated adjournment requests.
The judgment also reaffirms that disciplinary proceedings are open proceedings by default and that privacy or anonymity will not be granted lightly, even where a party claims to face harassment. This protects the public’s right to scrutiny of professional regulation and prevents discipline proceedings from becoming confidential forums immune from public oversight.