Background
Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 allows any party to disqualify a judge simply by filing an affidavit stating the judge is prejudiced. The disqualification is automatic — no proof of actual bias is required. Since the statute’s adoption, reports of abuse have mounted: district attorney offices, public defenders, and county counsel have used section 170.6 to blanket-challenge judges from all or most of their caseloads, effectively forcing judges off assignments the presiding judge selected them for.
In this case, petitioner J.O. alleged that San Joaquin County Counsel filed approximately 325 section 170.6 challenges against Judge Erin Guy Castillo in conservatorship cases over less than four months — after she admonished a deputy county counsel for improper conduct. The blanket challenges allegedly forced Judge Guy Castillo’s reassignment from the mental health and conservatorship department to a court handling misdemeanors and traffic cases. The trial court felt bound by the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Solberg v. Superior Court, which held that blanket challenges did not unconstitutionally impair judicial operations, and denied petitioner’s objection.
The Court’s Holding
In a unanimous opinion by Justice Groban, the California Supreme Court overruled Solberg to the extent it barred as-applied challenges to blanket abuses of section 170.6 on separation of powers grounds. The court found that since 1977, California’s judiciary has changed dramatically: caseloads have tripled, budgets have been slashed, judicial shortages persist, and a proliferation of specialty courts and sweeping legislative reforms have made judicial assignment authority far more critical. In this context, blanket abuse of section 170.6 now “materially impairs” the judiciary’s core constitutional function of administering justice effectively — a test that Solberg itself acknowledged could evolve over time.
The court held that the separation of powers conflict arises from the legislative scheme itself, not just from executive-branch actors. This means blanket challenges by any party — prosecutors, public defenders, county counsel, or even private attorneys — may be challenged on constitutional grounds if they amount to bad-faith blanket strikes.
The court adopted a three-step procedure modeled on Batson v. Kentucky. First, the opponent of a section 170.6 motion must timely object and establish a prima facie case that the movant is lodging bad-faith blanket challenges — for example, by showing persistent strikes against the same judge in all or a substantial portion of that judge’s assigned cases. Second, if a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the proponent of the motion to offer a good-faith explanation for believing the judge is prejudiced in the specific case. Third, a different judge conducts a hearing to determine whether the challenges were made in bad faith. If so, the motion is denied and the case stays with the challenged judge.
Key Takeaways
- Courts may now look behind a section 170.6 affidavit and scrutinize whether a party is engaging in blanket bad-faith challenges to a judge — something that was categorically barred under Solberg since 1977.
- The new three-step Batson-like procedure protects a party’s legitimate right to disqualify a biased judge while giving courts a tool to prevent weaponization of the statute against judicial independence.
- The holding applies to all litigants — prosecutors, public defenders, government attorneys, and private practitioners — though institutional parties who dominate court calendars pose the greatest risk.
- The court emphasized that a single good-faith challenge in one case remains fully protected. The opinion targets only blanket patterns of challenges driven by retaliation, judge-shopping, or disagreement with a judge’s legal rulings.
- District attorneys, public defenders, and county counsel offices statewide should review internal challenge practices to ensure compliance with this new framework.
Why It Matters
This decision reshapes a nearly 50-year-old rule that had become one of the most criticized features of California litigation practice. For decades, parties could effectively remove judges from entire case categories — sometimes forcing reassignments that disrupted courtrooms and delayed cases — with no judicial remedy. Presiding judges and court administrators now have a constitutional tool to push back when peremptory challenges cross from legitimate protection into bad-faith manipulation.
For practitioners, the practical import is significant. Offices that have blanket-challenge policies — whether explicit or informal — need to reassess immediately. A challenge that once was immune from scrutiny can now trigger a Batson-style hearing before a different judge, requiring the challenging party to articulate a case-specific, good-faith basis for believing the judge is prejudiced. For litigants on the receiving end of blanket challenges, the opinion opens a path to object that previously did not exist. And for the broader legal community, the decision signals the court’s willingness to adapt longstanding procedural doctrines to the realities of modern court administration.