Background
The Utah Supreme Court held that a voluntary settlement does not qualify as an “award” under the contribution provision of Utah’s Alcoholic Product Liability Act. The Act, commonly called the Dramshop Act, imposes a form of strict liability on alcohol sellers in specified circumstances. Its contribution section allows a person against whom an award is made to bring a separate action against another person who caused the injury. Because no adjudicator imposed the settling bars’ payments, the statutory cause of action never arose.
The case followed a motor-vehicle crash allegedly caused by an intoxicated driver, Corbin Celotto. The injured driver sued Celotto and five bars, alleging the establishments overserved him. After two bars were dismissed, the plaintiff settled with Celotto and the remaining bars. RMB, Inc. and Shaman, Inc. then pursued crossclaims seeking contribution from Celotto for amounts the bars had agreed to pay.
Celotto obtained summary judgment by arguing that section 32B-15-302(1)(a) covers an adjudicated award, not money paid under a voluntary agreement. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed. On certiorari, the bars relied on broader usages such as “settlement award,” common-law contribution principles, and the practical reality that most civil cases settle.
The Court’s Holding
Associate Chief Justice Pohlman’s opinion affirmed based on the statutory text read in context. The operative phrase applies to a person “against whom an award is made.” That wording describes something imposed by a person or body with authority, not a payment voluntarily promised in exchange for dismissal. Even if speakers sometimes call settlement proceeds an award, the surrounding words resolve any possible uncertainty.
The court rejected the common-law argument because the bars did not identify a precise contribution principle recognized in Utah that the legislature supposedly incorporated. It also rejected their policy argument as untimely and insufficient under Utah’s narrow absurdity doctrine. A rational legislature could limit contribution in a strict-liability scheme to liabilities imposed by judgment or comparable adjudication. The court therefore held that settling defendants cannot use this provision to recover from Celotto and affirmed summary judgment.
Key Takeaways
- A voluntary Dramshop Act settlement is not an “award made against” the settling party under Utah Code section 32B-15-302(1)(a).
- Calling a payment a settlement award does not overcome the narrower meaning supplied by the full statutory phrase.
- Alcohol sellers must account for contribution rights when structuring settlements because the statutory remedy may be unavailable afterward.
Why It Matters
The decision materially affects allocation strategy in Utah alcohol-liability litigation. Bars and insurers cannot assume they can settle first and pursue an allegedly responsible patron later under the Act’s contribution section. Before funding a settlement, they should consider a global agreement, an assignment, contractual allocation, or another legally available mechanism that addresses all potentially responsible parties.
For Utah statutory-interpretation practice, RMB is another reminder that dictionaries and colloquial labels do not displace linguistic and structural context. The court also signaled that policy concerns about discouraging settlements belong primarily to the Legislature when the enacted language is clear. Counsel drafting releases should avoid preserving a contribution claim that the statute itself does not create.