Skechers — Appeals Court treats outsourced shoe production as manufacturing
The Massachusetts Appeals Court held that Skechers was a manufacturing corporation because its detailed control continued through outsourced production.
The Massachusetts Appeals Court held that Skechers was a manufacturing corporation because its detailed control continued through outsourced production.
The Fourth Department held that a free dealership courtesy vehicle is not a rental under the Graves Amendment, leaving New York owner liability intact.
The Utah Court of Appeals held that retaining stolen property can continue until possession ends, making the prosecution of a stolen skid steer timely.
A divided Utah Supreme Court held that a prosecutor may file a delinquency petition after an ineligible minor received a nonjudicial adjustment from probation.
The Utah Supreme Court held that bars that voluntarily settle a Dramshop Act claim cannot seek contribution under a provision limited to persons against whom an award is made.
The South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the Administrative Law Court’s property tax ruling, holding that the “current fair market value” floor for the ATI exemption is the pre-sale value on the assessor’s books—not that value inflated by improvements the prior owner completed before the sale closed. Because the improvements were already incorporated into the ATI fair market value of $8,034,000 used to compute the exemption value, the Assessor’s approach of re-adding them to the current fair market value floor impermissibly double-counted them. The taxable value for tax year 2022 was $6,063,000, not $6,821,000.
The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed a contempt order against the Wyoming Boys’ School for refusing to admit an alleged delinquent juvenile before adjudication. The court held that Wyoming law expressly prohibits pre-adjudication placement at WBS, which is a reformatory for adjudicated delinquents — not a juvenile detention facility — and that the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering such placement. All three exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied, allowing the court to reach the merits despite the case having been resolved below.
The Commonwealth Court, sitting en banc, affirmed zoning variances for a 190-foot Verizon cell tower in Upper Macungie Township but adopted a new post-Loper Bright framework: carriers must first attempt to satisfy the MPC’s property-specific hardship requirements, then—if unmet—seek TCA-based relief under the two-part APT Pittsburgh coverage-gap-and-least-intrusive-means test, rejecting the Third Circuit’s FCC-derived “materially inhibit” standard. President Judge Cohn Jubelirer concurred in the result but vigorously disputed the majority’s analytical approach.
The Massachusetts Appeals Court held that the Juvenile Court has jurisdiction under G.L. c. 210, § 1, to hear a birth mother’s motion to revoke her adoption consent and to approve an open adoption agreement, even though the consent was executed before the subject child was added to a pending care and protection petition, because the 1993 statutory amendments require only that a care and protection proceeding be pending when the motion is filed—not that it was pending when the consent was executed.
In a question of first impression, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that N.C.G.S. § 31-3.3 does not permit attesting witnesses to adopt signatures written entirely by a third party: because the statute expressly allows the testator to have another sign on his behalf but omits any similar provision for witnesses, the legislature’s intent is that witnesses must physically sign the will themselves, rendering invalid a revised will whose two witness signatures were written by the notary at the witnesses’ verbal direction while the witnesses never touched the pen.
In a first-impression decision, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that N.C.G.S. § 31-3.3 bars attesting witnesses from having a third party write their signatures on a will, applying the expressio unius canon to the statute’s express testator proxy-signing provision and affirming summary judgment invalidating a revised will whose two witnesses never physically touched the pen.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court and held that “skill game” devices—electronic gaming terminals marketed as legal skill-based alternatives to slot machines—are “slot machines” under the Gaming Act and prohibited “gambling devices” under the Crimes Code, with a 120-day stay giving operators time to adjust before enforcement resumes.
The Appellate Division, Second Department holds that 42 U.S.C. § 9658 — CERCLA’s federal discovery rule for toxic tort statutes of limitations — applies to all state-law toxic tort actions involving hazardous substance exposure, even where no CERCLA liability exists. CPLR 214-c’s accrual date is displaced by the federally required commencement date in Brookhaven Landfill cancer-cluster litigation.
The Commonwealth Court held that nonprofit, member-owned golf clubs are not “businesses” subject to a local business privilege tax on membership dues and assessments, because the clubs do not operate for profit and their members do not receive commercially taxable “services” — rejecting Radnor Township’s reliance on Fish v. Township of Lower Merion.
The Commonwealth Court held that Pennsylvania’s Real Estate Tax Sale Law exceptions procedure does not permit constitutional challenges to the validity of a tax levy, affirming dismissal of a pro se taxpayer’s Uniformity Clause attack on Delaware County school taxes as beyond the scope of the RETSL exceptions process.
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, sitting en banc, upheld Luzerne County’s $10,100 fee for bulk CAMA property assessment data, holding that Pennsylvania’s Right-to-Know Law permits market-value-based fees for complex data sets — not merely the cost of duplication — and that coordinating pricing information across counties does not constitute bad faith.