Background
Joseph Davis brought civil proceedings against Ireland and the Attorney General arising from his April 2021 arrest during COVID-19 restrictions, detention at Bridewell Garda Station, and four nights in Cloverhill Prison. He alleged that he was deprived of liberty otherwise than in accordance with law and sought damages for constitutional breaches, false imprisonment, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, misfeasance in public office and defamation.
Davis applied to be exempted from court fees under section 5 of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Court (Fees) Order 2014, which provides that no fee is payable in connection with proceedings under Article 40.4 of the Constitution. The State argued that the exemption was confined to habeas corpus and related current-detention proceedings.
The Court’s Holding
Mr Justice Cregan granted the application. The Court held that Davis’s action was, in substance, a proceeding under Article 40.4.1, which guarantees that no citizen may be deprived of personal liberty save in accordance with law.
The fee exemption in section 5 was not confined to habeas corpus applications under Article 40.4.2 and 40.4.3. Article 40.4.1 could support civil proceedings seeking declarations and damages for a past allegedly unlawful deprivation of liberty. The Court held that Davis was therefore exempt from stamp duty and entitled to a refund of stamp duty already paid. The ruling did not decide the merits of his underlying claims.
Key Takeaways
- The Article 40.4 court-fee exemption can apply to substantive civil claims alleging a past unlawful deprivation of liberty.
- A claimant need not be currently detained or bring habeas corpus proceedings to fall within the exemption.
- A bare reference to Article 40.4 is insufficient; the pleadings must substantively and bona fide allege deprivation of liberty otherwise than in accordance with law.
Why It Matters
The decision confirms the High Court’s interpretation that the 2014 Fees Order uses broader language than the earlier fee regime, which expressly referred to habeas corpus proceedings. It removes court-fee barriers for properly pleaded civil claims alleging unconstitutional deprivation of liberty.
The judgment is procedural only. It leaves for later determination whether Davis’s arrest and detention were lawful and whether he is entitled to damages.