Background
S.H. is a parent simultaneously facing criminal prosecution and proceedings to terminate her parental rights. After the Harris County district court presiding over her parental-termination case verified her indigence, the court appointed attorney Margaret Lombardo as temporary attorney ad litem. Two days later, a different trial court ordered the Harris County Public Defender’s Office to represent S.H. in a concurrent criminal case.
The Public Defender’s Office subsequently agreed to represent S.H. in the parental-termination case as well. However, when the Office’s lawyer appeared on S.H.’s behalf in the termination proceedings, the district court removed the lawyer, concluding that the court alone had the authority to appoint counsel for S.H. in the termination case.
S.H. petitioned the Texas Supreme Court for mandamus relief, arguing the removal order violated her right to counsel of her choice.
The Court’s Holding
The Texas Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief and directed the district court to withdraw its removal order, finding the order was a clear abuse of discretion. The per curiam opinion held that while a court has authority to appoint counsel for indigent parents in termination cases, that authority does not extend to excluding an attorney who has been retained or who has agreed to represent the parent through another legitimate channel.
The Court emphasized that once the Public Defender’s Office—already representing S.H. in her parallel criminal case—agreed to represent her in the termination proceedings, the district court lacked authority to remove that representation simply because the court preferred its own appointee. The parent’s statutory and constitutional right to counsel encompasses the right to be represented by qualified counsel who has agreed to take the case.
Key Takeaways
- A trial court’s authority to appoint counsel for indigent parents in termination cases does not include the power to exclude other qualified counsel who has agreed to represent the parent.
- When a Public Defender’s Office already representing a parent in criminal proceedings agrees to also represent the parent in parallel termination proceedings, the termination court cannot remove that attorney solely to maintain its own appointee.
- The decision reinforces that the right to counsel in parental-termination cases—often called the “death penalty of civil cases”—includes meaningful protections about who provides that representation.
Why It Matters
This mandamus opinion has practical significance for Texas family courts, public defender offices, and parents facing simultaneous criminal and CPS cases. The decision clarifies that indigent parents have some measure of choice in representation—courts cannot treat the appointment power as exclusive control over who represents the parent. For county public defender offices, the opinion confirms they may extend representation to parallel civil proceedings without requiring separate court permission in the civil case.
The ruling is particularly important given the growing recognition that parallel criminal and termination proceedings create unique risks for parents, and coordinated representation by a single office may better protect against self-incrimination and conflicting strategies.