Background
Marshall Isiah Grady pleaded guilty under a plea agreement to interference with commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The district court imposed an aggregate 120-month prison sentence followed by five years of supervised release.
At sentencing, the district court orally required Grady to submit to warrantless searches by law-enforcement or probation officers based on reasonable suspicion that he had violated a supervised-release condition or engaged in unlawful conduct. The written judgment stated that such searches could occur “at any time.” Grady appealed, arguing that this language materially differed from what the court orally imposed and therefore violated United States v. Rogers.
The Court’s Holding
The Fourth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. Reviewing de novo, the court held that there was no material discrepancy between the orally pronounced search condition and the condition contained in the written judgment.
The sentencing court’s oral pronouncement did not restrict searches to daytime hours. Accordingly, adding “at any time” in the written judgment neither conflicted with the oral sentence nor imposed an additional obligation on Grady. The panel added that, even if the oral condition were ambiguous as to timing, the written language permissibly clarified that condition rather than altering it.
Key Takeaways
- A district court must orally pronounce all discretionary conditions of supervised release.
- A written judgment may clarify or spell out an orally imposed condition without creating a Rogers error.
- Because the oral search condition contained no time-of-day restriction, the written phrase “at any time” did not materially change Grady’s sentence.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the distinction between a written judgment that adds a new supervised-release obligation and one that merely clarifies an obligation pronounced at sentencing. A material conflict can require resentencing, but different wording alone is insufficient when the written condition remains consistent with the oral sentence.
For sentencing practitioners, the opinion underscores the importance of examining the complete oral pronouncement before asserting that a written condition expands a defendant’s obligations.