Background
Jermar Hardin appealed an order from the Western District of North Carolina revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 12 months in prison.
Hardin challenged the finding that he committed “Violation 1,” arguing that the government had agreed not to proceed on that violation and that the evidence was insufficient. He also argued that his revocation sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court considered a prohibited factor.
The Court’s Holding
The Fourth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. Reviewing the revocation decision for abuse of discretion and the underlying factual findings for clear error, the court concluded that the district court followed the procedures required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 and did not err in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Hardin committed Violation 1.
Because Hardin had not preserved his sentencing argument in the district court, the Fourth Circuit reviewed it for plain error. Considering the district court’s entire sentencing explanation, the court held that any error did not affect Hardin’s substantial rights because he failed to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent the asserted error.
Key Takeaways
- A district court may revoke supervised release upon finding a violation by a preponderance of the evidence after providing the procedural protections required by Rule 32.1.
- The Fourth Circuit found no abuse of discretion or clear error in the district court’s treatment of Violation 1.
- An unpreserved challenge to the factors considered in imposing a revocation sentence is reviewed for plain error, including whether the alleged error affected substantial rights.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the deferential review applied to supervised-release revocations when the district court follows Rule 32.1 and supports its factual findings. It also underscores the importance of preserving objections to a revocation sentence: even assuming an error, an appellant must establish a reasonable probability that the error changed the result.
Because the opinion is unpublished, it is not binding precedent in the Fourth Circuit.