Background
East Devon District Council granted prior approval for the proposed conversion of an agricultural building at Shoots Lane, Sheldon, Devon, to a guesthouse under Class R of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015. After Marie-Claire Di Mambro challenged that decision, the Council accepted that its officer’s report had not properly addressed whether the building was used for an agricultural trade or business, formed part of an established agricultural unit, or complied with the applicable cumulative floor-space limits.
A consent order granted permission for judicial review, quashed the Council’s decision, and remitted the application for redetermination. The order left the court to decide whether further relief was appropriate. Di Mambro sought declarations concerning paragraph W(11) of the GPDO, which permits development to begin if the authority fails to notify its decision within 56 days, and also advanced possible claims for damages, a declaration of incompatibility, and mandatory or injunctive relief.
The Court’s Holding
HHJ Russen KC held that paragraph W(11)(c)’s deemed-consent rule did not apply. The Council had notified the developer within the 56-day period that prior approval was granted. Although that decision was later quashed and therefore had no continuing legal effect, neither the decision nor its timely notification could be treated as if it had never occurred. The quashing consequently did not retrospectively convert the application into one on which the Council had failed to notify a decision within time.
The court also held that no additional human-rights remedy was available. The Council was not itself an independent and impartial tribunal for Article 6 purposes; compliance arose through the availability of judicial review, which Di Mambro had successfully used. In any event, because she lived away from the proposed development and accepted that it would not directly affect her, her interest was too tenuous to involve a determination of her civil rights or make her a victim for Human Rights Act purposes. The court therefore made no further order as to remedies or costs.
Key Takeaways
- A prior-approval decision communicated within the GPDO’s 56-day period prevents the deemed-consent rule from arising, even if that decision is later quashed.
- Quashing makes an unlawful decision legally ineffective but does not erase the historical fact that the authority made and notified it within time.
- A planning objector whose connection to the proposed development is remote cannot establish an Article 6 claim merely by acting as a public-interest watchdog.
Why It Matters
The judgment clarifies an important consequence of quashing a timely prior-approval decision: the developer does not automatically acquire a right to proceed through retrospective operation of the GPDO’s deemed-consent provision. The authority may instead redetermine the remitted application.
It also underscores that Human Rights Act remedies in planning cases depend on a claimant showing that the decision directly determines or affects an arguable civil right. A successful public-law challenge alone does not establish victim status or an entitlement to damages.