Background
Doug Arthur Wolshlager entered the Lincoln Township Hall seeking a Freedom of Information Act form. According to trial testimony, he yelled at employees, used vulgar language, refused requests to move or leave, threatened employees and their families, and poked the building official with a pen. Multiple employees testified that his conduct made them uncomfortable and prompted calls to police.
When officers arrived, Officer Wesley Springer-Grounds told Wolshlager that township employees wanted him removed and that he had to leave. Wolshlager refused, pulled his arm away when the officer grasped it, and was arrested. A jury convicted him of disturbing the peace and resisting or obstructing Springer-Grounds, while acquitting him of the obstruction count involving the second officer. Wolshlager, who had waived counsel and represented himself at trial, appealed both the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s handling of his later interest in public-defender assistance to obtain an expert witness.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed both convictions. It held that a rational jury could find that Wolshlager intentionally disturbed the peace in a public building because his yelling, vulgar insults, threats, and physical contact disrupted the township hall’s previously quiet environment and forced employees to interrupt their duties to respond, seek assistance, and call police. His conduct went beyond merely expressing a position or opinion.
The court also held that sufficient evidence supported the obstruction conviction. Springer-Grounds’s statement that Wolshlager “gotta go,” given after staff requested his removal, was a lawful command rather than a mere request. Wolshlager knowingly refused to comply for more than 30 seconds and expressly said he was not leaving. Because that failure independently supported the conviction, the court did not decide whether the officer was also making a lawful warrantless arrest.
Finally, the court rejected Wolshlager’s claim that the trial court violated MCR 6.005(B). The trial court identified the chief public defender, told Wolshlager whom to contact, explained that the public defender’s office would screen him for eligibility, and emphasized that counsel could help him obtain an expert. That constituted a proper referral to the appointing authority for indigency screening.
Key Takeaways
- A defendant’s aggressive yelling, threats, vulgar insults, physical contact, and disruption of public employees’ work can supply sufficient evidence of disturbing the peace in a public building.
- An officer’s contextually clear statement that a person “gotta go” may constitute a lawful command, and knowingly refusing it may qualify as obstruction under MCL 750.81d.
- A trial court complies with MCR 6.005(B) when it directs a defendant to the designated appointing authority and explains the indigency-screening process, even if the defendant later continues with self-representation.
Why It Matters
The unpublished decision illustrates how Michigan courts distinguish protected expression from conduct that intentionally disrupts public order and government operations. It also confirms that obstruction may rest on a knowing failure to comply with a lawful command, without requiring the appellate court to decide whether a later arrest was independently lawful.
For self-represented defendants, the opinion shows that a court’s referral obligation under MCR 6.005(B) may be satisfied through specific oral directions identifying the appointing authority and explaining how to seek screening and representation.