Background
Michael Shaun Moriarty was driving on a dark rural road after 9:00 p.m. when his Toyota RAV4 struck and killed Todd Mullin, who was at the roadway’s edge with a disabled motorcycle. Moriarty admitted drinking six or seven beers, and the parties stipulated that his blood-alcohol content was 0.18% at the time of the collision. Mullin was wearing dark clothing, a black helmet, and retroreflective shoes.
At trial, the parties’ accident-reconstruction experts disagreed about whether the collision was avoidable. The prosecution’s expert testified that Moriarty could have changed lanes or swerved, while the defense expert opined that even a sober driver would not have had enough time to react. The defense also presented evidence that Mullin had alcohol, THC, and methamphetamine in his system, although its toxicology expert could not say that Mullin’s impairment contributed to the crash. A jury convicted Moriarty of operating while intoxicated causing death, and the trial court denied his motions for acquittal notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial.
The Court’s Holding
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find that Moriarty’s operation of the vehicle proximately caused Mullin’s death. Viewed in the prosecution’s favor, the evidence permitted the jury to find that Mullin’s conduct—including his intoxication, location near the roadway, and limited reflective clothing—amounted at most to ordinary negligence, not gross negligence or intentional misconduct that would supersede Moriarty’s conduct and break the causal chain.
The court explained that the jury was entitled to credit the prosecution’s reconstruction expert over the defense expert and could reasonably regard darkness on a rural road and a disabled vehicle near the shoulder as foreseeable conditions. It distinguished People v. Feezel because the jury here was allowed to consider the victim’s intoxication and possible gross negligence; Feezel did not require the jury to reach a particular conclusion from that evidence. Moriarty waived any challenge to the causation instructions by expressly approving them at trial.
The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a new trial. The evidence did not weigh so heavily against the verdict that allowing the conviction to stand would constitute a miscarriage of justice, and nothing indicated that passion, prejudice, or another extraneous influence drove the verdict.
Key Takeaways
- A victim’s intoxication or negligence does not automatically sever proximate causation in an operating-while-intoxicated-causing-death prosecution.
- Only an unforeseeable intervening act, such as gross negligence or intentional misconduct, generally breaks the causal chain; ordinary negligence remains reasonably foreseeable.
- When experts disagree about whether a collision was avoidable, an appellate court reviewing evidentiary sufficiency defers to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores that superseding cause ordinarily presents a fact-specific jury question. Evidence of a victim’s impairment and conduct must be considered when relevant, but its admission does not compel a finding that the victim was grossly negligent or that the defendant’s conduct was not a proximate cause.
The opinion also illustrates the importance of preserving instructional objections: counsel’s express statement that the defense was satisfied with the instructions waived appellate review of their complexity or accuracy.