Background
Monica Cruz sought a plenary stalking no-contact order against her neighbor, Lisa Holmes, also seeking protection for Cruz’s two minor children. Cruz alleged that Holmes let loose dogs that threatened children, made statements about the dogs biting Cruz’s son, and sat on a fire hydrant in front of Cruz’s home while staring at it.
The circuit court initially entered a default plenary order after Holmes missed a hearing, but later vacated that order and held an evidentiary hearing. Cruz testified about the incidents and a video not included in the appellate record. Holmes testified that her dogs escaped while she was away, that no one was bitten, and that she had not threatened Cruz or her children.
The Court’s Holding
The Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District, affirmed the Macon County circuit court’s denial of a plenary stalking no-contact order. A petitioner must prove stalking by a preponderance of the evidence, including a course of conduct involving two or more acts directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear for safety or suffer emotional distress.
The trial court found one proven incident: Holmes sitting outside Cruz’s home and staring at it. But it found no evidence that Holmes intentionally released her dogs or caused them to behave aggressively toward Cruz or her children. Because the evidence did not establish a second stalking act, the appellate court held that the denial was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Key Takeaways
- A stalking no-contact order requires proof of a course of conduct, meaning at least two qualifying acts.
- Evidence that dogs escaped did not, on this record, prove that Holmes intentionally used them to threaten Cruz or her children.
- Appellate courts defer to the trial court’s credibility determinations and will not reweigh conflicting testimony.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores that a petitioner’s fear, while relevant, does not itself establish stalking under the Stalking No Contact Order Act. The evidence must prove the statutory elements, including at least two acts constituting a course of conduct.
It also illustrates the limited nature of manifest-weight review when the trial court resolved competing accounts of neighborhood conduct and alleged threats.