Dunstan v Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages (No 2) — Applicant ordered to pay Registrar’s costs

Case
Dunstan v Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages (No 2)
Court
Supreme Court of Queensland
Date Decided
27 August 2026
Citation
[2026] QSC 200
Topics
Judicial review, costs, public interest litigation, domestic violence privacy

Background

Tanya Dunstan sought judicial review of the Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages’ decision to release information to John Dudley Neill. On 22 June 2026, the Supreme Court summarily dismissed her review application and an interlocutory application. The Registrar then sought its costs on the standard basis.

Ms Dunstan, who was self-represented and had received a reduced filing fee for financial hardship, sought costs relief under s 49 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld). She also alleged apprehended bias and sought the judge’s recusal from deciding costs, arguing that the proceeding concerned privacy and safety risks for domestic-violence victims and their children.

The Court’s Holding

McCafferty J refused to recuse. The substantive application had already been decided, no disqualification application had been made before that decision, and Ms Dunstan’s complaints about the correctness of the dismissal did not establish a basis to doubt the judge’s impartiality on the remaining question of costs.

The Court declined to make a special costs order under s 49. Although Ms Dunstan’s impecuniosity favoured consideration of each party bearing its own costs, the review application lacked a reasonable basis and had been summarily dismissed as out of time, with other available avenues for relief not pursued. Its public-interest element did not exceed the ordinary public interest in lawful performance of statutory duties; the proceeding principally sought to vindicate Ms Dunstan’s private rights and was not public-interest litigation or a test case. Costs therefore followed the event.

Key Takeaways

  • A self-represented applicant’s financial hardship alone does not displace the ordinary rule that the unsuccessful party pays costs.
  • Section 49 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 requires attention to public interest and the merits of the review application, but does not immunise unsuccessful applicants from costs.
  • Allegations that a judge reached the wrong result do not, without more, establish apprehended bias in determining costs.

Why It Matters

The decision confirms that judicial-review claims concerning government decisions may have a public dimension without qualifying as public-interest litigation for special-costs purposes. Applicants seeking protection under s 49 must show more than a personal dispute with possible broader implications.

It also illustrates the costs risk where a judicial-review proceeding is filed late or before other available remedies are pursued, even where the underlying concerns involve privacy and personal safety.

⬇ Download the original opinion (PDF)Archived from the court's official source.
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