Background
NK, an Algerian national, had been refused refugee status, subsidiary protection and permission to remain. A deportation order was made on 11 June 2025 and notified on 18 June 2025. She did not challenge those decisions, but sought revocation of the deportation order under section 3(11) of the Immigration Act 1999; that request remained under consideration.
On 3 June 2026, the International Protection Accommodation Service (IPAS) told NK that, because she had received a final negative protection decision, she would be moved from IPAS accommodation in Athlone to temporary accommodation at the Ibis Hotel at Red Cow, Dublin. NK, then completing a nursing degree and placement, said the move would seriously disrupt her studies. After an unsuccessful ex parte injunction application, she sought leave for judicial review and a stay or injunction.
The Court’s Holding
Mr Justice Bradley refused leave to apply for judicial review. NK had ceased to be an “applicant” and “recipient” under the International Protection Act 2015, the Reception Conditions Regulations 2018 and the Reception Conditions Directive once the final protection refusal issued. Her pending section 3(11) revocation request did not suspend the deportation order or restore that status.
The court held that the transfer was a consequential operational measure arising from unchallenged decisions that remained presumptively valid. The IPAS letter gave adequate reasons in context: it clearly identified the final negative decision and the new accommodation. NK’s education, employment and asserted Article 8 private-life interests did not disclose an arguable basis to quash the transfer, and Luximon was distinguishable. There was also no arguable basis for mandamus requiring a decision on the section 3(11) request, given the Minister’s stated intention to decide it by the end of July 2026.
Key Takeaways
- A pending section 3(11) request to revoke a deportation order does not suspend the order.
- A person with a final negative protection decision is no longer entitled to reception conditions as an applicant or recipient.
- An accommodation-transfer decision may be upheld as consequential on unchallenged immigration decisions.
Why It Matters
The judgment underscores that a challenge to a downstream accommodation decision cannot ordinarily be used to collaterally challenge final, unchallenged protection and deportation decisions. It also confirms that the ordinary judicial-review leave threshold is arguability, but NK failed to meet it on these facts.
The court separately refused interim relief under Okunade, finding that the balance of justice favoured implementation of the prima facie valid immigration decisions and that NK’s educational circumstances did not displace that position.