Background
David Charles was charged with ten counts of Class C felony child molesting based on conduct involving two girls between 2001 and 2007. The evidence at his bench trial described years of intertwined physical and sexual abuse. Children who regularly encountered Charles testified that they feared him, scattered when he arrived, and were subjected to beatings with belts, electrical cords, blind handles, and a piece of wood. Charles claimed a biblical justification for punishment and insisted that beatings leave bruises.
The testimony also described private punishments in which girls were made to undress and bend over. Witnesses said Charles appeared excited, sometimes exposed and erect, and later touched the injuries he had caused. They also described his viewing violent pornography around the children, followed by inappropriate touching. Victim #2 testified that, beginning when she was about six, Charles touched her upper thigh, chest, buttocks, and private areas under the guise of tickling more than 100 times. She also recounted being forced to sit on his lap while viewing pornography and feeling his erect penis against her.
After a bench trial, the Elkhart Superior Court found Charles guilty on all ten counts. It imposed eight years on each conviction, ordered consecutively, for seventy years executed and ten years suspended to probation. On appeal, Charles challenged only the five counts involving Victim #2. He argued that the State had not proved the statutory element that his touching was intended to arouse or satisfy sexual desires.
The Court’s Holding
The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed. Judge Bradford explained that intent is a mental state ordinarily proved through conduct, surrounding circumstances, and reasonable inferences. For child molesting, Indiana law permits the factfinder to infer sexual intent from the nature and location of the touching and from the natural and usual sequence of the defendant’s conduct. A conviction does not require direct evidence of intent, and inappropriate touching need not be limited to genitals or breasts.
Victim #2’s testimony supplied sufficient evidence. She described repeated touching of her breasts, buttocks, upper thigh, and private areas, sometimes while alone with Charles. The upper thigh was close to her genitals, and the testimony about sitting on Charles’s lap while he was erect added context from which the trial judge could infer a sexual purpose. The appellate court also considered testimony from two other victims describing Charles’s arousal during punishment and inappropriate touching.
Taken together, the testimony permitted the trial judge to infer sexual intent beyond a reasonable doubt. The court emphasized that one child witness’s testimony can sustain a molesting conviction. Charles’s contrary account asked the appellate panel to reassess credibility and reweigh evidence, which sufficiency review does not allow. The court noted that even without challenged references to Victim #2’s earlier police statements, her other testimony and the corroborating circumstances amply supported the verdicts.
Key Takeaways
- Indiana permits sexual intent in a child-molesting prosecution to be proved circumstantially from the defendant’s conduct and its surrounding context.
- Touching breasts, buttocks, an upper thigh, or naked skin can support the required inference; direct genital touching is not necessary.
- A single child’s testimony may sustain a molesting conviction, while consistent testimony about related conduct can strengthen the permissible inference of intent.
- A sufficiency appeal cannot succeed merely by offering a less incriminating interpretation of evidence the factfinder reasonably credited.
Why It Matters
The decision gives Indiana trial lawyers a compact statement of how sexual intent may be proved when a defendant characterizes touching as tickling or discipline. Prosecutors should connect the locations touched with the broader sequence of conduct rather than rely on labels alone. Here, frequency, isolation, pornography, physical arousal, and similar conduct involving other victims collectively supported the inference.
For defense counsel, the opinion illustrates the difficulty of a pure sufficiency challenge after a bench trial. The appellate question is not whether an innocent inference exists, but whether any reasonable factfinder could find the element proved. Challenges to admissibility or preservation of prior statements must be developed separately; the panel treated the unchallenged trial testimony and contextual evidence as independently sufficient.