Background
Braijon Burton was convicted in Allegheny County of second-degree murder and several related offenses arising from a fatal shooting, vehicle theft, high-speed police chase, and additional gunfire. In a severed bench proceeding, he was also convicted of being a person prohibited from possessing a firearm because he was a fugitive from justice. The sentencing court imposed mandatory life imprisonment without parole for felony murder, plus a consecutive prison term for other offenses.
On appeal, Burton raised facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges to the firearm-disability statute under United States v. Rahimi. He had not raised those constitutional theories at trial, sentencing, or in his post-sentence motions. The Superior Court therefore found them waived; adding a claim to a Rule 1925(b) appellate statement does not preserve an issue that was never presented to the trial court.
A separate sentencing problem arose while the appeal was pending. In Commonwealth v. Lee, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that automatically imposing life without parole on every person convicted of second-degree murder creates too great a risk of disproportionate punishment under Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution when the person did not kill or intend to kill.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Lazarus wrote that the Superior Court could address the legality of Burton’s sentence on its own initiative even though his preserved appellate issues concerned the firearm conviction. Burton had been sentenced under the mandatory scheme that Lee declared unconstitutional. His judgment of sentence therefore had to be vacated.
On remand, the sentencing court must conduct an individualized assessment of the circumstances, Burton’s personal characteristics, and his culpability. The court may again impose life without parole if that punishment is justified after individualized consideration. Alternatively, it may impose the statutorily required maximum of life imprisonment with a minimum term that allows parole consideration.
The panel stressed that Lee does not guarantee release or even a parole-eligible sentence in every felony-murder case. It removes the categorical mandate and requires meaningful consideration of whether the individual offender’s conduct and culpability justify permanent imprisonment without an opportunity for release.
Key Takeaways
- After Commonwealth v. Lee, Pennsylvania courts may not automatically impose life without parole for second-degree murder without an individualized culpability assessment.
- Resentencing may still produce life without parole, but the court must explain why the defendant’s conduct and characteristics warrant it.
- An illegal sentence can be corrected by an appellate court sua sponte even when the parties focus on different issues.
- Constitutional challenges to a conviction remain waived if they first appear in a Rule 1925(b) statement rather than in the trial court proceedings.
Why It Matters
Burton shows Lee moving quickly from constitutional holding to case-level remedy. Counsel handling direct appeals involving second-degree murder should evaluate whether a mandatory life-without-parole sentence remains pending and should develop a remand record directed to individual culpability, role in the homicide, personal history, rehabilitation, and public-safety considerations.
The memorandum also clarifies the limited nature of the remedy. Pennsylvania has not eliminated life without parole for felony murder. It has replaced an automatic penalty with sentencing discretion bounded by constitutional proportionality and a record-specific explanation.