Background
Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc. sought to construct and operate an asphalt plant in Butler Township, Luzerne County. The proposed site lay in the township’s Mineral Industrial District. The zoning ordinance’s definitions and district-purpose provisions associated mineral extraction and related heavy industrial activity with that district, while its table of uses placed asphalt plants in the Industrial District as a special-exception use. Another section regulated “Mineral Extraction (and Asphalt, Batch or Concrete Plant)” and addressed circumstances in which the operations occupy the same lot.
Hawbaker filed a substantive-validity challenge and proposed curative amendment. It argued that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because a landowner could not determine where an asphalt plant was permitted. Alternatively, it contended that the ordinance was de facto exclusionary because no Industrial District property could satisfy the special-exception standards. The township supervisors rejected the challenge, and the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas affirmed.
Neighboring landowners David and Stacy Rowlands intervened in the land-use appeal. Hawbaker challenged their intervention as well as the merits of the zoning decision. The Commonwealth Court therefore considered both the neighbors’ enforceable interest and the ordinance’s internal directions.
The Court’s Holding
President Judge Cohn Jubelirer wrote for the majority, affirming intervention but reversing on the substantive-validity challenge. Nearby owners whose property interests could be affected by the proposed industrial use had a sufficient basis to participate. The trial court acted within its discretion in permitting their intervention.
On the ordinance, the majority concluded that its provisions failed to give property owners fair notice. The definitions and stated purpose of the Mineral Industrial District indicated that asphalt production belonged with mineral extraction, while the table of uses directed asphalt plants to the Industrial District by special exception. Section 602(28), which jointly addressed mineral extraction and asphalt, batch, or concrete plants, added to the uncertainty rather than supplying a clear location rule.
Zoning ordinances carry a presumption of validity, and courts do not invalidate them merely because interpretation is difficult. Here, however, the conflicting signals concerned the basic question where the use could occur. The majority held that a landowner should not have to guess which of the ordinance’s competing provisions controls. It therefore ruled the scheme unconstitutionally vague and reversed the supervisors’ decision. Because that holding resolved the validity challenge, the court did not decide whether the ordinance also operated as a de facto exclusion of asphalt plants.
Judge Wojcik agreed that intervention was proper but dissented from the vagueness holding. In his view, the table of uses was the ordinance’s operative assignment provision and unambiguously allowed asphalt plants only in the Industrial District by special exception; policy tension with definitions or purpose clauses did not create unconstitutional uncertainty.
Key Takeaways
- A zoning ordinance may be unconstitutionally vague when its operative and contextual provisions give conflicting answers about where a use is allowed.
- Definitions, district-purpose clauses, use tables, and use-specific regulations must be read together rather than treating the table as automatically conclusive.
- Nearby landowners may intervene when a proposed heavy industrial use could affect their legally protected property interests.
- A court need not reach a de facto exclusion theory after granting relief on vagueness grounds.
Why It Matters
The decision gives Pennsylvania municipalities a drafting warning: use tables, defined terms, district purposes, and supplemental standards must point in the same direction. Ambiguity about conditions attached to a clearly assigned use may be resolved through ordinary construction, but contradictory placement signals can become a constitutional notice problem.
Developers evaluating industrial sites should review the entire ordinance and preserve both interpretive and substantive-validity challenges. Municipal counsel should amend legacy provisions when use tables have evolved without corresponding updates elsewhere. The dissent also identifies the likely fault line for future cases—whether a clear use table controls despite discordant surrounding text, or whether the ordinance as a whole leaves the regulated party guessing.