Background
In December 2022, Covington Homes, LLC submitted a subdivision application to the Georgetown County Planning Commission (Planning Commission) proposing six duplexes — twelve units total — on a two-acre parcel on Pawleys Island. At a public hearing on January 19, 2023, the Planning Commission voted to recommend denial of the application. Under Georgetown County Zoning Ordinance 607, however, the application was then forwarded to Georgetown County Council (County Council) for final disposition. At its February 14, 2023 meeting, County Council reversed the Planning Commission and approved the subdivision.
Adjoining landowners and community organizations — including Parkersville Planning & Development Alliance, Keep It Green, and Preserve Murrells Inlet, Inc. — filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the approval. They argued that the provisions of Ordinance 607 giving County Council authority to make the final call on site plans conflicted with the South Carolina Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Enabling Act of 1994 (the Enabling Act), S.C. Code Ann. §§ 6-29-110 to -1640, which explicitly vests final site plan approval authority in the Planning Commission. Appellants also contended that County Council’s decision was arbitrary and conflicted with the County’s Comprehensive Land Use Plan, and that they did not need to allege a specific constitutional deprivation to bring the challenge.
The circuit court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP. It concluded the Enabling Act’s general provisions authorized County Council as the local legislative body to make zoning rules, found no constitutional deprivation was alleged, and held the Comprehensive Plan was merely a guideline and therefore could not form the basis of a legal challenge.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals reversed. Writing per curiam, with Judges Konduros, Geathers, and Vinson concurring, the court held on both grounds raised on appeal.
On the conflict with the Enabling Act, the court focused on § 6-29-1150, which provides that “the action of the planning commission is final” on site plan approvals, with any appeal taken to the circuit court within thirty days. Sections 607.207, 607.306, and 607.4025 of Georgetown County’s Ordinance 607 required site plans for larger developments to be “approved by County Council” in addition to being reviewed by the Planning Commission — effectively giving County Council a veto over Planning Commission decisions. The court held that this arrangement created an “irreconcilable” conflict with the Enabling Act, which leaves no room for a second layer of approval above the Planning Commission. “While the local legislative body is given discretion in determining certain requirements in the site approval process, the Enabling Act clearly states the decision of the Planning Commission is final,” the court wrote. In the absence of statutory authority, County Council’s approval was ultra vires and void. See Baird v. Charleston County, 333 S.C. 519, 531 (1999). The court also rejected the circuit court’s holding that the limitations period for challenging Ordinance 607 had run, since Appellants were within the thirty-day window to challenge the site plan approval itself under § 6-29-1150(D)(1), and the challenge to the approval incidentally attacked an invalid ordinance.
On the constitutional deprivation question, the court held Appellants were not required to plead a distinct constitutional violation to challenge an ultra vires County Council action. The challenge — that County Council lacked statutory authority to make the decision at all — does not directly attack the constitutionality of a substantive zoning ordinance, so Knowles v. City of Aiken, 305 S.C. 219 (1991), which requires a constitutional deprivation to challenge a legislative zoning decision, was inapplicable. In any event, the complaint alleged County Council’s action was arbitrary, alleged disparate impacts on the minority community, and identified specific property harms (increased traffic, stormwater, and inadequate infrastructure) — all of which were sufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion even if a constitutional deprivation were required.
Key Takeaways
- Georgetown County Zoning Ordinance 607’s provisions requiring County Council approval of certain site plans — sections 607.207, 607.306, and 607.4025 — are invalid because they conflict with S.C. Code Ann. § 6-29-1150, which vests final site-plan-approval authority exclusively in the Planning Commission. Any County Council action purporting to approve or override a Planning Commission site-plan decision under those sections is ultra vires and void.
- The statute of limitations to challenge an invalid ordinance does not run separately from the limitations period to challenge the approval action itself. A timely appeal of the site plan approval under § 6-29-1150(D)(1) is sufficient to bring the underlying ordinance’s validity before the court.
- A challenge to a local government’s authority to act — as opposed to a direct challenge to the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance — does not require a separate allegation of constitutional deprivation. The Knowles constitutional-deprivation requirement applies to substantive zoning decisions by a governing authority acting within its power, not to ultra vires acts.
- Neighboring landowners and community organizations alleging concrete harms (property value reduction, traffic, stormwater, infrastructure burden, disparate community impact) have adequately alleged the necessary elements to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in a zoning challenge.
Why It Matters
Bryant v. Georgetown County has immediate practical significance for landowners and developers operating in Georgetown County and for any South Carolina county that has structured its zoning ordinances to give county council final authority over site plans. The Enabling Act’s plain-language mandate — “the action of the planning commission is final” — means that any local ordinance routing site plan decisions above the planning commission creates an unlawful extra-appellate layer. Georgetown County has already made amendments to Ordinance 607 since the approvals at issue, but the ruling calls into question any prior approval that went through Council over a Planning Commission denial during the period those provisions were in effect.
The decision was issued the same day as a companion ruling, Michael T. Green v. Georgetown County (2026-UP-288), which reached the same result on separate subdivision applications in the Parkersville community, reinforcing the court’s interpretation of § 6-29-1150. Practitioners advising county governments should audit their land development regulations for any provision that gives a governing body — rather than the planning commission — final sign-off on site plans. Developers who obtained approvals through County Council over a Planning Commission denial may face renewed challenges to project validity.