Background
The Alaska Court of Appeals affirmed a kidnapping conviction based on evidence that Iosia Fiso helped lead a group that confined a woman for three days while demanding compensation for an abandoned car. The unpublished memorandum opinion holds that the evidence showed more than mere presence and allowed jurors to find that Fiso promoted or facilitated the kidnapping. It also applies Alaska’s settled rule that jurors need not unanimously choose between principal and accomplice theories.
The victim bought or borrowed a barely functioning car for $100 and abandoned it after its brakes failed. Months later she was taken to an apartment where another man demanded $5,000 or a new BMW. A woman strip-searched her, taped her mouth and hands, and the group prevented her from leaving for three days. Witnesses described Fiso as “Boss Man,” the leader, and one of the people calling the shots. He directed the victim to remain in a bedroom and instructed others how to treat her.
The victim eventually proposed obtaining guns from friends in exchange for her release. The group arranged a parking-lot transfer. Surveillance footage showed Fiso arrive separately and watch from the edge of the lot during the planned exchange. The victim escaped into her friends’ vehicle, which sped away while people from the kidnappers’ van fired at it. A jury convicted Fiso as a principal or accomplice. He argued on appeal that the proof established only presence and that the jury had to agree unanimously on his precise mode of liability.
The Court’s Holding
Viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict, the court found the conviction adequately supported. Alaska’s kidnapping statute required proof that Fiso restrained another person with intent to hold her for ransom, reward, or other payment. Accomplice liability required proof that, intending to promote or facilitate the crime, he aided or abetted another person’s planning or commission of it.
The jury could infer knowledge and intent from Fiso’s conduct across the episode. He was present for the payment demand and while the victim was searched and bound. He exercised authority in the apartment, personally told her to remain, helped plan the proposed firearms exchange, and positioned himself at the parking lot as a lookout to ensure the transaction proceeded. These acts permitted an inference that he encouraged, supervised, and stood ready to aid the kidnapping rather than merely acquiescing in it.
The court also rejected the unanimity challenge. Alaska law does not require jurors to agree whether a defendant committed an offense personally or was accountable as an accomplice. Principal and accomplice liability are alternative routes to responsibility for the same crime, not separate offenses requiring a special unanimity instruction. The general verdict therefore remained valid.
Key Takeaways
- Leadership directions, planning activity, and serving as a lookout can establish intentional aid beyond mere presence at the scene.
- Knowledge and intent may be inferred from a defendant’s conduct throughout an extended restraint, even if another participant makes the explicit ransom demand.
- Alaska jurors must unanimously find the charged crime but need not unanimously classify the defendant as a principal or accomplice.
Why It Matters
Fiso is useful for Alaska trial lawyers evaluating accomplice cases built largely from circumstantial evidence. Prosecutors should connect each act to the defendant’s knowledge of the criminal objective and intent to help accomplish it. Defense counsel should distinguish ambiguous association from directions, planning, surveillance, or conduct that emboldens the principal, and should test whether the State’s evidence supports the required intent rather than status within a group.
The unanimity ruling also affects charging and instructions. A single count may proceed on principal and accomplice theories without requiring the jury to select one, provided both theories concern the same criminal act and the evidence supports liability. Counsel should still examine whether the State has combined factually distinct criminal acts, which can present a different unanimity question. Because the memorandum decision is nonprecedential, practitioners should cite the published authorities it applies when briefing the point.