Background
Christopher Johnson pleaded guilty to Level 6 felony possession of at least thirty grams of marijuana, elevated because of a prior drug conviction. His written plea agreement called for an eighteen-month sentence: six months executed, which could be served in community corrections, and twelve months suspended to probation supervision. It also allowed him to seek reduction of the conviction to a Class A misdemeanor after successfully completing all sentence terms within the original period.
The sentencing court imposed 545 days with 365 days suspended. Its abstract of judgment reflected that the 365 suspended days were probation, but the bottom of a separate plea-and-sentencing order stated that Johnson was placed on probation for ninety days. Johnson later reported that he completed ninety days of house arrest and ninety days of probation and petitioned for misdemeanor treatment.
A different trial judge found uncertainty about whether the original judge intended ninety days or 365 days of probation. Because Johnson’s probation officer said he had completed supervision, the court reduced the conviction. The State appealed, arguing that the written plea controlled and that Johnson had sought modification before completing the agreed twelve months.
The Court’s Holding
The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. Judge Bradford treated the accepted plea agreement as a binding contract between the State and defendant. Contract interpretation is reviewed de novo, beginning with the agreement’s plain language; genuine ambiguity is construed against the State as drafter.
Here, the agreement was not ambiguous. It expressly imposed “12 months suspended to probation supervision” following six months in community corrections. Johnson signed it, and the sentencing judge read its terms aloud before Johnson confirmed his understanding. The phrase described a full year of active supervision, not merely a suspended term whose supervisory duration could be shortened to ninety days.
The surrounding record reinforced that reading. The sentencing court announced that 365 of 545 days were suspended, and its abstract of judgment communicated the same probation term to the Department of Correction. Although another line in the plea-and-sentencing order referenced ninety days, that inconsistency did not make the negotiated agreement unclear or establish a different judicial intent.
Because Johnson had not completed the full agreed probation period when he requested misdemeanor treatment, the reduction was premature. The panel therefore restored the effect of the felony conviction and returned the matter for proceedings consistent with the plea agreement. Johnson filed no appellee’s brief, so the court was not required to develop counterarguments for him, but it still evaluated the State’s claim on its merits.
Key Takeaways
- An accepted Indiana plea agreement is binding on the State, the defendant, and the trial court and is interpreted under contract principles.
- A term imposing twelve months “suspended to probation supervision” unambiguously requires a full year of supervised probation.
- A conflicting clerical entry elsewhere in the sentencing paperwork does not necessarily override the written bargain and abstract of judgment.
- Eligibility for a negotiated felony-to-misdemeanor reduction depends on satisfying every condition stated in the plea agreement.
Why It Matters
Indiana criminal practitioners should reconcile every sentencing document before leaving the plea hearing. The agreement, oral pronouncement, sentencing order, and abstract should state identical executed and suspended terms. If a ninety-day entry conflicts with a negotiated twelve-month probation term, prompt correction is safer than allowing supervision and later modification proceedings to proceed on competing assumptions.
For defendants seeking alternative misdemeanor treatment, counsel should calculate eligibility from the accepted bargain and verify completion with the full record, not rely solely on a probation officer’s discharge statement. For prosecutors, the opinion confirms that an agreed reduction condition remains enforceable when the written language is clear, even if later paperwork introduces an apparent scrivener’s error.